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INTRODUCTION 
 A. Summary Overview  
  From its inception, the Guiding Principles for Business and 
Human Rights (“GPs”)1 have occupied a contentious and dynamic 
space.2 It has become a widely accepted framework for managing the 
behaviors of business activities that may impact human rights.3 But it 
has also become either a gateway or an obstacle in a long battle about 
the production of international law and national legal regulation of the 

1. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights [OHCHR], Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) [hereinafter Guiding 
Principles]. 
2. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt, Business and Human Rights, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 55 
(2005); David Weisbrodt, Human Rights Standards Concerning Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Entities, 23 MINN. J. INT’L L. 135 (2014); John G. Ruggie, Business and 
Human Rights: The Evolving Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819 (2007);  Rachel J. Anderson, 
Reimagining Human Rights Law: Toward Global Regulation of Transnational Corporations, 
88 DENV. U. L. REV. 183 (2010). 
3.  I noted elsewhere: 
During the transformation—from study, to normative framework, to Guiding 
Principles—important international human rights actors have also endorsed the 
approach. The European Union leadership has endorsed the framework. It is 
being incorporated into other soft law systems as a basis for interpretation, 
from that of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, to the 
corporate social responsibility frameworks of the International Organization 
for Standardization. Norway will “continue to support the Special 
Representative’s work both politically and financially.” The SRSG has begun 
to compile a list of  examples of influential people and organizations that have 
applied the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework. 
Larry Catá Backer, From Institutional Misalignments To Socially Sustainable 
Governance: The Guiding Principles For The Implementation Of The United Nations’ 
“Protect, Respect And Remedy” And The Construction Of Inter-Systemic Global Governance, 
25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 69, 78-79 (2012). See generally, Human 
Rights Council Res. 17/4, Rep. of the Hum. Rts. Council, 17th Sess., June 16, 2011, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 2011); Special Rep. of the Sec'y Gen., Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011).  
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activities of business enterprises.4 And it has been criticized for a lack 
of focus on the importance of domestic legal orders in the 
management of the human rights obligations of enterprises,5 or with 
respect to accountability.6  This Article considers the issues emerging 
from the front lines of these battlegrounds: (1) the conceptualization 
of the state duty to protect human rights through the framing of 
national action plans,7 (2) the operationalization of the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights through the framing of 
societally constituted reporting and assessment programs,8 and (3) the 
re-invention of the GP project as an expression of two dimensional 
internationalized state power and its challenge to the GP’s three 
dimensional project.9  
 This Article first examines the way states might approach 
their obligations to protect human rights as elaborated most recently 
in the GPs. Using the framework of National Action Plans 
("NAPs")recently encouraged by the UN Working Group on the issue 
of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises,10 the section suggests that these plans, and the approach 
undertaken by many states to implement the GPs may be misdirected.  
 This Article then turns to a consideration of the equally thorny 
issue of enterprise approaches to their obligations to respect human 

4. See, e.g., Jean-Marie Kamatali, The New Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights’ Contribution In Ending The Divisive Debate Over Human Rights Responsibilities of 
Companies: Is It Time For an ICJ Advisory Opinion?, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 437 
(2012) (arguing that “while the work of the SRSG has made a significant contribution to the 
debate surrounding human rights violations by transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, it has done little to offer an authoritative global standard solution to the long-
standing and deeply divisive debate over the human rights responsibilities of companies.”); 
Larissa van den Herik & Jernej Letmar Cernic, Regulating Corporations Under International 
Law: From Human Rights to International Criminal Law and Back Again, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 725 (2010). These pick up strands of an older set of arguments. See, e.g., Paul Redmond, 
Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights: Options for Standard Setting and Compliance, 
37 INT’L LAW 69 (2003). 
5. See, e.g., Jernej Letnar Cernic, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The 2010 Report 
by the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, 11 GERMAN L.J. 1264 
(2010). 
6. See Jena Martin Amerson, ‘The End of the Beginning?’: A Comprehensive Look at the 
U.N.’s Business and Human Rights Agenda From a Bystander Perspective, 17 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 871 (2012). 
7. Infra Part II. 
8. Infra Part III 
9. Infra notes 292-300 and accompanying text. 
10. UN Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises, National Action Plans, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).  
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rights under the GPs. Two are examined more closely: (1) the Human 
Rights Reporting and Assurance Frameworks Initiative (RAFI) 
Project, and (2) the World Federation of Exchanges’ (WFE) new 
sustainability working group to consider an Investor Listing Standards 
Proposal. Both are promising yet might be modified to better 
operationalize the corporate responsibility to respect human rights.  
 The Conclusion turns to the effect of a move to supplement or 
supplant the GPs with a treaty framework. Yet, if the NAP framework 
and the RAFI/WFE processes can be most usefully understood as 
mapping projects preliminary to the hard substantive work of 
constructing rule of law norms in the legal and societal spheres, then 
the current treaty making effort represents both a culmination of the 
GP process and an effort to return to the state of things before the GP 
process started. That contradiction requires resolution.  
 This Article proposes a way in which the move toward treaty 
making may be integrated with the GPs state duty to protect prong 
and the discipline of NAPs and may help to frame interactions with 
the corporate responsibility. The current efforts to develop a treaty for 
business and human rights, then, might be most usefully understood 
and applied in this light—to use the treaty machinery to construct a 
well-integrated, long term, and ultimately comprehensive rule of law 
system for business and human rights, binding on all states, which can 
serve as a means of connection with the development of transnational 
business behavior norms that fall within the social (non-state) sphere. 
Together these three efforts suggest the current context of the project 
of business and human rights, a context in which the role of state, 
enterprise and international community remains fluid, contingent and 
undefined. The choices made by each of these critical players will 
determine the shape of business and human rights governance 
systems for some time to come.    
 B.  Context and Roadmap  
On 16 June 2011, the UN Human Rights Council endorsed11 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (the “GPs“)12 for 
implementing the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy“ Framework.13  

11. Guiding Principles, supra note 1.   
12. Id. at iv. The Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles in its resolution 
17/4 of  June 16, 2011. 
13. See U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Rep. of the Human Rights 
Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
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Developed under the mandate of Special Representative John Ruggie, 
the UN Secretary General on Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, the GPs provide—for 
the first time—a global standard for preventing and addressing the 
risk of adverse impacts on human rights linked to business activity.14 
The Guiding Principles are framed as three related governance 
regimes--a First Pillar concerning state duty to protect human rights, a 
Second Pillar concerning corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights, and a Third Pillar obligation to provide effective remedies for 
breaches of human rights.15 These pillars: 
. . . are grounded in recognition of (a) states’ existing obligations 
to respect, protect and fulfill human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
(b) the role of business enterprises as specialized organs of society 
performing specialized functions, requiring to comply with all 
applicable laws and to respect human rights; and (c) the need for 
rights and obligations to be matched to appropriate and effective 
remedies when breached.16  
Since their endorsement, the GPs have become an important 
standard by which to frame business and human rights discourse, and 
the values that they represent.17 This has not always been viewed as a 
positive development,18 especially by those who would have preferred 

“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (March 21, 2011) (the 
Special Representative annexed the Guiding Principles to his final report to the Human Rights 
Council (A/HRC/17/31), which also includes an introduction to the Guiding Principles and an 
overview of the process that led to their development).  
14. JOHN G. RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 124-27 (2013). 
15. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Rep. of the Human Rights 
Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008).  
16. Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 1. 
17. UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND BUSINESS, available at http://www.ihrb.org/project/eu-sector-guidance/un-
guiding-principles.html  (“The Guiding Principles establish an authoritative global standard on 
the respective roles of businesses and governments in helping ensure that companies respect 
human rights in their own operations and through their business relationships . . . . The 
Guiding Principles have played a key role in the development of similar standards by other 
international and regional organizations, leading to global convergence around the standards 
they set out.”). 
18. Carlos López, The ‘Ruggie process’: from legal obligations to corporate social 
responsibility?, in HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? 58, 58 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013) (“The GPs 
were warmly greeted by business representatives, but less so by the non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and other civil society groups represented in the HRC.”).  
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a formal treaty mechanism19 in place of the “soft” law polycentric 
approach of the GPs.20 The conventional view among these 
constituencies is that the GPs, at best, serve as little more than a 
starting point for the attainment of agendas, usually clothed in the 
formalities of international law frameworks along traditional lines.21 
As a consequence, from their inception, the GPs have remained 
controversial22—at once setting the framework for operationalization 
of regimes of business and human rights by states and enterprises, and 
simultaneously posing as either as a gateway or obstacle to the 
production of international law and national legal regulation of the 
activities of business enterprises.23  
 This Article considers the issues emerging from the front lines 
of these battlegrounds—all framed by the GPs. It specifically 
considers three such battleground campaigns: (1) the 
conceptualization of the state duty to protect human rights through the 
framing of national action plans, (2) the operationalization of the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights through the framing 
of societally constituted reporting and assessment programs, and (3) 

19. See, e.g., Joint Civil Society Statement on the draft Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights, The International Federation for Human Rights, (Jan. 14 2011), 
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/Joint_CSO_Statement_on_GPs.pdf; David Bilchitz, A Chasm 
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’? A critique of the normative foundations of the SRSG’s Framework 
and the Guiding Principles, in HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? 107, 137 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz, eds., 
2013). 
20. Larry Catá Backer, On the Evolution of The United Nations’ “Protect-Respect-
Remedy” Project: The State, the Corporation and Human Rights in a Global Governance 
Context, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 37, 42 (2011); Larry Catá Backer, From Institutional 
Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance: The Guiding Principles for the 
Implementation of the United Nations’ “Protect, Respect and Remedy” and the Construction 
of Inter-Systemic Global Governance, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 69, 74 
(2012). 
21. See, e.g., Robert C. Blitt, Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Charting an Embracive Approach to Corporate Human Rights Compliance, 48 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 33, 33-62. (2012). 
22. Cf. BRYAN HORRIGAN, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY: DEBATES, MODELS AND PRACTICES ACROSS GOVERNMENT, LAW AND BUSINESS 
302-39 (2010). 
23. See, e.g., The United Nations and Transnational Corporations: From Code of 
Conduct to Global Compact, Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/
IA/2009/10; Mahmood Monshipouri et al., Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of 
Global Responsibility: Problems and Possibilities, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 965, 980 (2003); see also 
Larry Catá Backer, From Guiding Principles to Interpretive Organizations: Developing a 
Framework for Applying the UNGPs to Disputes that Institutionalizes the Advocacy Role of 
Civil Society, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BEYOND THE END OF THE BEGINNING (César 
Rodríguez-Garavito ed., 2015, forthcoming).  
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the re-invention of the GP project as an expression of two 
dimensional internationalized state power and its challenge to the 
GP’s three dimensional project.  
Part II considers the quite thorny issue of the way States might 
approach their obligations to protect human rights as elaborated most 
recently in the GPs. Using the framework of National Action Plans 
recently encouraged by the UN Working Group on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
the section suggests that these plans, and the approach undertaken by 
many states to implement the GPs may be misdirected. Rather than 
focusing on inward discipline, transparency, and cohesion of domestic 
law and policy, states have tended to focus outward on efforts to 
regulate the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. In the 
process they ignore one of the most important elements of the state 
duty to protect human rights—the obligations of states to get their 
own governmental houses in order and to minimize governance and 
remedial gaps within the architecture of state power. The section 
concludes that national action plans may provide useful vehicles for 
states to conduct internal human rights due diligence and to build a 
sound governmental (and inter-governmental) foundation on which 
the management of the human rights behaviors of business might be 
most effectively undertaken. That might suggest that NAPs to focus 
on transparent and accessible human rights law and policy mapping, 
on the articulation of human rights sensitive governance operations 
for state owned enterprises and adequate contractual oversight of 
enterprises performing traditional governmental functions, and the 
appropriate management of sovereign investment (both internally in 
development and externally in foreign projects and markets).  
 Part III turns to a consideration of the equally thorny issue of 
the way enterprises might approach their obligations to respect human 
rights under the GPs. To that end it considers non-state initiatives, and 
in particular the potentially promising framework being developed 
through the Human Rights Reporting and Assurance Frameworks 
Initiative ("RAFI") Project,24 and the recent efforts of the World 

24. See The Business And Human Rights Reporting And Assurance Frameworks 
Initiative (“RAFI”): Project Framing Document, SHIFT PROJECT (November 2013). The U.N. 
Working Group  has supported this initiative.  It issued the following statement on its support: 
The  Working  Group  expresses  its  firm  support  for  the  ‘Reporting  and  
Assurance Frameworks  Initiative’  and  is  engaging  with  this  project  as  
part  of  its  mandate  to  promote  implementation  of  the  Guiding  Principles  
and  as  part  of  its  strategy  to collaborate  with  stakeholders  to  provide  
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Federation of Exchanges’ ("WFE") new sustainability working group 
to consider an Investor Listing Standards Proposal.25  The RAFI 
project represents an effort to provide guidance to companies that 
may be committed to better demonstrate their alignment with the 
GPs.26 The Exchange based sustainability reporting seeks to provide a 
basis for the routinization of sustainability or ESG (environmental, 
social and governance) reporting as part of listing requirements for 
exchanges.27 This section suggests that while both represents an 
essential advance in the project of providing a usable framework for 

further  clarification  on  the  application of  the  Guiding  Principles. The  
Working  Group  considers  its  participation  in  the  Eminent Persons  Group  
for  the  project  as  a  positive  step  in  furthering  the  implementation  of  the  
Guiding  Principles  by  supporting  the  development  of  tools  for  companies  
to  verify  whether  their  processes  are  aligned  with  the  Guiding  Principles,  
and  for  auditors  to  review  and  verify  company  practices.  The  project  
was  discussed  during  the  Working  Group’s  5th  session  in  Geneva  in  
June  2013  during  which  the  Working  Group emphasised  and  was  assured  
that  any  products  resulting  from  the  project  would  be  free  and  non-
-proprietary,  and  that  the  development  process  should  be  transparent  and  
engage  all  relevant  stakeholders.  The  Working  Group  will  review  the  
findings  of  the  project  as  appropriate.  The  Working  Group  understands  
that  the  resulting  standards, including  the  qualification  of  assurance  
providers,  will  be  overseen  by  an  appropriate,  independent  governing  
body,  whether  existing  or  founded  for  this  purpose. 
U.N. Working Group Statement on its Support for the Reporting and Assurance 
Frameworks Initiative Led by Shift, Mazars and the Human Rights Resource Centre for 
ASEAN, SHIFT PROJECT, available at http://shiftproject.org/sites/default/files/
UN%20Working%20Group%20Support%20for%20RAFI.pdf. The Working Group Statement 
is discussed in  Business and Human Rights, The Business and Human Rights Reporting and 
Assurance Frameworks Initiative (“RAFI”): Summary of Points Raised, With Clarifications, 
Responses and Emerging Priorities for Consultation Updated as of October 2013 pp. 8-9, 
available at http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/summary-of-
points-raised-oct-2013.pdf. 
25. See Investor Listing Standards Proposal: Recommendations for Stock Exchange 
Requirements on Corporate Sustainability Reporting, CERES (March 2014), 
http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/investor-listing-standards-proposal-recommendations-
for-stock-exchange-requirements-on-corporate-sustainability-reporting.  
26. RAFI’s developers’ note: 
 As these dynamics develop, the inevitable question arises as to what good 
reporting on company alignment with the UN Guiding Principles – and good 
assurance of such reports – should involve. RAFI aims to help answer this 
question.  
 The proposed reporting and assurance frameworks will be public, meaning 
that they will be non-proprietary and publicly available to all companies and 
assurance providers to use in their work. They are intended to be relevant to, 
and viable for, all companies and auditors/assurance providers in any region, 
and to dovetail with existing reporting initiatives.  
See RUGGIE, supra note 14, at 5. 
27. See id. at 8.  
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practicing respect for human rights, the project remains a work in 
progress.  Some areas that require continued attention. Among the 
most important are objectives based (neither can be all things to all 
stakeholders, and the effort to make it so make dissipate its 
usefulness). As important, to the extent that they seek to be used as a 
culture-changing project, these cultural components will have to be 
aligned to corporate interests more directly. Moreover, to the extent 
either can be understood as a mapping project, its structures may 
require some fine-tuning. Lastly, operationalization in the societal 
constitutional sphere always runs the danger of heroic 
instrumentalization, especially the danger of embracing a heroic 
approach to human rights reporting. The work of creating cultures of 
human rights sensitivities as a core basis of corporate culture requires 
fewer heroes and many more ordinary people who perform their roles 
in corporate operations without regarding the human rights sensitive 
portions of their work as “special“ or extraordinary“ or somehow not 
an ordinary part of their work. It is to that end that RAFI and 
Exchange reporting systems might judge its effectiveness as a vehicle 
for internal discipline and external disclosure. In that context the 
RAFI framework construct might be usefully understood as a prequel 
to the harder task of building a rule of law (non-state based) system of 
rules for the disciplining of business conduct with human rights 
detrimental effects in the social sphere. Its key value, then, is as a 
mapping exercise rather than as anything like a due diligence manual.  
And in that respect, RAFI responds to the same impulse, and ought to 
respond in the same way, as the Working Group’s construction of 
sound NAP frameworks. As self-reflexive mapping projects, they 
invite conversation on which action and governance decisions may be 
made, and from out of which more comparable and harmonizing 
techniques might be developed. 
 If the NAP framework and the RAFI/WFE projects point 
toward harmonization, does international law provide the key to the 
establishment of such a collective regime in the legal sphere? The 
Conclusion considers this question in the context of an important 
return of a most thorny issue indeed—a return to the ideological 
multilateral nationalism of the 1970s,28 a return to the state, and a 
potential broadening of the schism between states that understand 
economic, social and cultural rights as a predicate for civil and 

28. See The United Nations and Transnational Corporations, supra note 23.  
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political rights, and those which are convinced that civil and political 
rights are the predicate and framework through which economic, 
social and political rights may be realized. To that end it considers, in 
a brief and preliminary way, the embrace by the UN Human Rights 
Council of two related but quite distinct treaty making projects. One, 
signaling a victory for the tenacity of Ecuador produced a vote to 
“establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group on a 
legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights, the mandate of 
which shall be to elaborate an international legally binding instrument 
to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”29 This is an 
effort that has been praised by civil society elements30 but criticized 
prominently by John Ruggie.31 The other was adoption of a 
resolution, sponsored by Norway, sought to move multilateral treaty 
efforts back within the architecture of the GP.32  Specifically it 
directed the UN mechanism currently charged with the elaboration of 
the GPs to prepare a report considering, among other things, the 
benefits and limitations of legally binding instruments.33 These efforts 
have been interpreted by their respective proponents as a natural 
progression from the 2011 endorsement of the GPs.  But each 
considers the efforts of the other as a rupture in that progression. 
Treaty proponents view the Guiding Principles framework as falling 
short in their aims to provide adequate remedies and resistance to 
their efforts as a means of sabotaging the necessary progression to the 
legal framework for the regulation of corporate conduct that would 
expose upstream corporate entities to liability well downstream in the 

29. H.R.C. Res. Human Rights Council Draft Res., 26th Sess., U.N. G.A., 
A/HRC/26/L.1 (Jun. 25, 2014) (elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights); 
H.R.C., 26th Sess., Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights, including the right to development, Agenda item 3, 
A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (June 25, 2014). The resolution was sponsored by Bolivia, Cuba, 
Ecuador, South Africa, and Venezuela. Id. 
30. Global Movement for a Binding Treaty, TREATY ALLIANCE 
http://www.treatymovement.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (“Now is the time to join the 
chorus of global civil society calling for new strong international law and send the right 
message that powerful corporations must not violate human rights.”). 
31. See John G. Ruggie, A UN Business and Human Rights Treaty?: An Issues Brief by 
John G. Ruggie (Jan. 28, 2014), available at http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/
media/documents/ruggie-on-un-business-human-rights-treaty-jan-2014.pdf.  
32. H.R.C. Draft Res., 26th Sess., U.N. G.A., A/HRC/26/L.1, at 3 (June 23, 2014). 
33. Id. 
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supply chain.34 Treaty opponents view the move toward treaty 
discussions as a means of sabotaging a necessary progression for the 
operationalization of the GPs.35   
 The Article ends by proposing that the current move toward 
developing comprehensive treaty instruments for business and human 
rights may be understood in context and harmonized with the GP 
process. Fashioning a comprehensive treaty might be most usefully 
understood and applied as an important movement forward to use the 
treaty machinery to construct a well-integrated, long term, and 
ultimately comprehensive rule of law system for business and human 
rights. Business and human rights treaties can help construct an 
international rule of law system binding on all states in equal 
measure, and which can serve as a means of connection with the 
development of transnational business behavior norms that fall within 
the social (non-state) sphere. Together, then, these three efforts 
suggest the possibilities and dangers of the current context of the 
project of business and human rights, a context in which the role of 
the state, enterprise and international community remains fluid, 
contingent and undefined. Indeed, the paths taken by international and 
national stakeholders in the construction of governance systems 
across these governance frameworks since 2011 suggest both the 
power of the logic of the GP framework, and its frailty. The choices 
made by each of these critical players—states, enterprises and 
international organizations—will determine the shape of business and 
human rights governance systems for some time to come.  

34. On the former, see Conectas, Forum on Business and Human Rights Statement (Nov. 
30, 2012), available at http://www.conectas.org/en/actions/business-and-human-
rights/news/un-forum-on-business-and-human-rights.  On the latter, see, Press Release, 
Friends of the Earth Europe, EU standing up for corporate interests instead of human rights at 
the UN (June 25, 2014) (“The EU is taking a strong, unified position to vote no to the Ecuador 
proposal, because this very effective proposal would ultimately mean starting negotiations for 
a binding Treaty with rules for transnational corporations, including many European 
corporations. The EU openly stated that, if the Ecuadorian resolution was adopted, the EU will 
refuse to cooperate, thereby actively undermining a democratic process and isolating itself.”). 
35. Mark Fafo, A Business and Human Rights Treaty? Why Activists Should be Worried, 
INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS (June 4, 2014) (“Opposition to the idea of a 
treaty from states and business is to be expected. What is more surprising is the extent to 
which civil society appears to support the idea, apparently blind to the very real risks of de-
railing their own agenda . . . . I think activists around the world should be worried by a treaty 
process in Geneva as it is presently formulated: the substance of the process is way too broad 
and risks boxing all activism on corporate accountability into a protracted treaty process in 
which accountability will have to compete with other issues and activists will have less clout 
than in comparable processes.”) 
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I. ON THE PROBLEM OF THE STATE AND THE STATE DUTY TO 
PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS: THE WORKING GROUP AND 
NATIONAL ACTION PLANS 
 As part of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Right’s (“OHCHR”) mandate to lead the business and human rights 
agenda within the United Nations system and to further elaborate the 
GPs and its operationalization, the UN Human Rights Council, at its 
17th session,36 also established a Working Group on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, consisting of five independent experts, of balanced 
geographical representation.37 In collaboration with the Working 
Group, OHCHR provides guidance on interpretation of the Guiding 
Principles.38 In 2012, OHCHR issued an Interpretive Guide to the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights.39 
 It is within this administrative context that one expects to see 
much of the international institutional work of providing influential 
guidance for implementing the GPs by states, corporations and others. 
Yet, despite the polycentricity at the heart of the GPs (its recognition 
of multiple intersecting but autonomous behavior shaping regimes),40 
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36. Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 17th Sess.,  
U.N. GAOR, A/HRC/RES/17/4, at 2 ¶6 (July 6, 2011); see also Guiding Principles, supra note 
1. 
37. The members include Mr. Michael Addo, Ms. Alexandra Guaqueta, Ms. Margaret 
Jungk, Mr. Puvan Selvanathan, and Mr. Pavel Sulyandziga. See Working Group on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, UNITED 
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/
WGHRandtransnationalcorporationsandotherbusiness.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).  
38. See, e.g., Human Rights Council Res. 21/5, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 21st 
Sess., U.N. GAOR, A/HRC/RES/21/5 (Oct. 16, 2012) (discussing the contribution of the 
United Nations system as a whole to the advancement of the business and human rights agenda 
and the dissemination and implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights).  
39. See U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide, HR/PUB/12/02 (2012); U.N. 
Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Issue of the applicability of the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights to minority shareholdings, RRDD/DESIB/CM/ff 
(2013) (opinion issued by OHCHR in response to a request regarding the Guiding Principles 
and the financial sector); U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Allegations 
regarding the Porgera Joint Venture remedy framework (July 2013) (opinion issued by 
OHCHR in response to letters regarding the Porgera remediation framework); U.N. Office of 
the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Request from the Chair of the OECD Working Party on 
Responsible Business Conduct (Nov. 27, 2013) (advising the OECD on the application of the 
Guiding Principles to the financial sector). 
40. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Transnational Corporations’ Outward Expression of 
Inward Self-Constitution: The Enforcement of Human Rights by Apple, Inc., 20 IND. J. 
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the state (and its domestic legal orders) remains at the center of 
human rights systems.  Sometimes, as I have argued elsewhere, that 
centrality can have perverse effects.41 Still, it remains fundamentally 
important to recognize the role of states in contributing to human 
rights enhancing behaviors—of itself and its governmental apparatus, 
of its citizens, and of the businesses over which it asserts authority.  
 The efforts of states under the GP are founded on the First 
Pillar duty42 to “protect against human rights abuse within their 
territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business 
enterprises”43 as a specific expression of the basic general state duty 
to “respect, protect and fulfill human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”44 They also extend to the Third Pillar duty to “take 
appropriate steps to ensure, through judicial, administrative, 
legislative or other appropriate means, that when such abuses occur 
within their territory and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to 
effective remedy.”45 Recently the Working Group has sought to 
encourage States to think more comprehensively about their role 
under GP Pillars I and III by engaging in the exercise of preparing 
“National Action Plans.”46  These NAPs are understood to offer a tool 
for governments to articulate priorities and coordinate the 
implementation of the GPs, to effectively conduct a due diligence 
exercise in the furtherance of their duty to protect human rights:  
 The UN Working Group strongly encourages all States to 
develop, enact and update a national action plan as part of the 
State responsibility to disseminate and implement the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights.  
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GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 805 (2013); cf. Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy 
and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, in 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 137-
64 (June 2008) (developing an analysis of key elements of accountability and legitimacy 
relationships of polycentric regulatory regimes, especially where regimes are faced with the 
need to respond to multiple legitimacy and accountability claims); see also Kevin T. Jackson, 
The Polycentric Character of Business Ethics Decisionmaking in International Contexts, 23 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 123 (2000). See generally NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE 
PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL LAW (2010). 
41. See Larry Catá Backer, The 2nd U.N. Forum on Business and Human Rights Live 
Streaming and Thoughts on Trends in Managing Business Behaviors, LAW AT THE END OF 
THE DAY (Dec. 3, 2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/the-2nd-un-forum-on-
busness-and-human.html.  
42. Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 3. 
43. Id. at 3. 
44. Id. at 1. 
45. Id. at 27. 
46. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights [OHCHR], State National 
Action Plans (June 2014).  
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  The Working Group recognises the challenges of producing 
a comprehensive and effective national action plan and it is 
willing to assist States in this process.47  
The Working Group has also recognized that such efforts can 
exact significant costs in terms of institutional resources that may be 
required to undertake the effort.  Many states with modest means and 
institutional infrastructure, or with modest experience in the area, may 
find the task of NAP preparation harder.48 To ease that burden, build 
capacity and promote harmonious development of national 
approaches (subject, of course, to the national context in which these 
exercises are undertaken), the Working Group, with the help of civil 
society,  has sought to develop guidance for states in fashioning 
contextually relevant NAPs.49 To that end, it set out an ambitious 
consultation and information gathering process.50 It is in that context 
that it may prove useful to consider not merely the specific elements 
for guiding states in the preparation of NAPs, but also the 
fundamental premises that should serve as the base on which to build 
such plans. A consideration of those issues is the object here. In 
developing guidance for the preparation of NAPs it is useful to keep 
the principal objective in mind--a focus on developing those essential 
substantive and process elements of NAPs in the implementation of 
the GPs.51 These ought to include the sharing of early lessons, the 
identification of opportunities, risks and challenges in plan 

47. Id. 
48. See U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights, Guidance on National 
Action Plans on Business and Human Rights Ver. 1.0 (1 Dec. 1, 2014), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/UNWG_%20NAPGuidance.pdf. The 
Working Group launched a guidance program for states on December 1, 2014 at the Third 
Annual United Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights, held in Geneva from December 
1-3, 2014. 
49. See, e.g., International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR) and the Danish 
Institute for Human Rights (DIHR), “Toolkit for the Development, Implementation, and 
Review of State Commitments to Business and Human Rights Frameworks,” available at 
http://accountabilityroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/DIHR-ICAR-National-
Action-Plans-NAPs-Report3.pdf (making the case for NAPS); id. at 8-14. 
50. These include a number of events between January 2014 and December 2016, open 
consultations, regional meetings, online communications, expert workshops and consultations, 
to launch draft guidance on national action plans. The Working Group will pilot the guidance 
for two years, review responses and deliver a final guidance on State national action plans in 
December 2016. See id.  
51. This is in line with the mandate of the Working Group and with the expectations for 
the development of the GPs. See H.R.C. Res. 17/4, Human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, 17th Sess.,  U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 16, 
2011). 
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construction, the development of a common understanding of 
essential NAP elements, the mapping of important policy options set 
out in the GPs, the framework within which the connections between 
the First and Third Pillars  (state duty and  remedies, respectively) 
ought to be addressed, and the focus on regulatory coherence (both 
internally and multi-laterally). As important, the NAPs ought to 
develop mechanisms for monitoring, assessing and transparency of 
national goals and efforts. This Third (Remedies) Pillar provides an 
opportunity to deepen an essential element of GP implementation--
meaningful civil society participation, comprehensive buy-in from a 
broad cross section of government (including administrative and 
legislative functionaries), and effective accountability in ways that 
permit a constant re-assessment and development of GP 
implementation as national conditions change.  
One of the great difficulties of the NAP process is to provide 
guidance on unpacking the fairly dense language of the GPs and their 
relevant commentaries in a way that adheres to the spirit and intent of 
the GPs. While that is the essence of operationalization, it also 
requires going beyond a narrow reading of the “rules” and embracing 
mechanisms and techniques that provide functional attainment of the 
GP’s objectives. This involves substantially more than regulatory 
“gap filling” or “interpretation”; it also requires further development 
of the GPs themselves in line with their functional premise. Here it 
becomes evident that the GPs become a powerful tool when they are 
understood not in formalist (and narrowly legal) terms, but in 
functional and policy terms. In this sense, lawyers play an important, 
but not an essential, part.  The action may sound in the language of 
governance but the spirit must be rooted in policy.  And the object of 
the exercise must be centered on the state itself first.  The state is 
hardly in a position to undertake its duty to protect human rights if it 
is not functionally able to even effect this duty.  The basic human 
rights due diligence exercise focused primarily on the state and its 
capacity for undertaking its duty successfully, then, is or ought to be 
at the heart of any NAP exercise. This approach is particularly 
important in four critical areas that will be considered here: (1) 
defining the principal focus of the state duty under the GPs (gaps, 
risks, regional considerations); (2) trade and investment agreements 
and procurement; (3) judicial and non-judicial mechanisms; and (4) 
due diligence and disclosure requirements. 
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A. Defining the Principal Focus of the State Duty under the GPs 
(Gaps, Risks, Regional Considerations)  
The core focus of NAP construction necessarily centers on the 
relationship of the GPs to state action.  It has been all too common for 
the focus of this exercise to turn outward from the state to the objects 
of the regulatory exercise, that is to focus on the regulation of 
enterprises rather than on the scope of the state duty to protect human 
rights.52 As one commentator noted with respect to Poland, “Reasons 
for this omission include the conviction that human rights are not 
relevant in the case of Poland, due to higher legal standards in some 
areas; as well as the conviction that business would certainly oppose 
regulatory solutions. More prosaic reasons include expenditure cuts 
and insufficient staff numbers.”53 Indeed, in both the Netherlands and 
the U.K., the development of the NAP was assigned to the foreign 
ministries, an indication that the focus was both on business 
management and outbound conduct.54  The baseline for human rights 
rested on an otherwise unexamined domestic legal order. There thus 
appears to be a tendency to jump directly to GP Principles 1 and 255 
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52. For example, the UK National Action Plan focuses on the state’s regulation of its 
corporations to conform to human rights norms already part of the domestic legal order of the 
UK. Good Business: Implementing the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (September 2013), 
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
236901/BHR_Action_Plan_-_final_online_version_1_.pdf  (“It embodies our commitment to 
protect human rights by helping UK companies understand and manage human rights.”).  The 
Dutch NAP also focuses on the scope of the state’s regulation of enterprises rather than on the 
state’s duty to protect human rights in light of international law and norms. NATIONAL ACTION 
PLAN ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, available at http://www.netherlandsmission.org/
binaries/content/assets/postenweb/v/verenigde_staten_van_amerika/the-permanent-mission-to-
the-un/actionplanbhr.pdf. Its “Action Points” focused on the legalization of the corporate duty 
to respect human rights. Id. at 13-14.  
53. Beata Faracik, The Role of the State in Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on 
Human Rights and Business with Special Consideration of Poland, 31 POLISH YEARBOOK 
INT’L L. 349, 386 (2011). 
54. See supra  note 52 and accompanying text. Likewise the Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has been charged with the drafting of the Italian National Action Plan. See THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE ITALIAN ACTION PLAN ON THE UNITED NATIONS “GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS” available http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/Business/NationalPlans/NationalPlanActionItaly.pdf (expressing 
“conviction that, without deducting any importance to national policies, only an authentically 
European dimension can bring about that political and contractual added value, allowing the 
field of human rights at global level to be really effective”).  
55. Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at ¶ 1 (“States must protect against human rights 
abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. 
”); Id. at ¶ 2 (“States should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises 
domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their 
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without stopping for a moment to undertake the more difficult basic 
task of the General Principles of the GP.56 The General Principles 
make clear that the overarching element of any state duty to protect 
human rights requires a focus on the political and administrative 
architecture of the State with respect to its existing legal obligations 
and policy objectives to protect and fulfill human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. But this omission is compounded by a 
tendency to see in GP Principle 1 no more than an obligation to use 
law to “harden“ a corporation’s obligations under Pillar II (the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights).57   
In that exercise the State, and its duty, disappear within its 
object—the multinational corporation. These ideas are sometimes 
expressed in the form variations of the question: do states have a duty 
to compel a company to respect human rights?58 But such an approach 
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operations.“). It is worth remembering that the focus on the enterprise is consequential rather 
than direct: “States’ international human rights law obligations require that they respect, 
protect and fulfill the human rights of individuals within their territory and/or jurisdiction. This 
includes the duty to protect against human rights abuse by third parties, including business 
enterprises." Id. at 3. 
56. General Principle (a) of the Guiding Principles expresses the basic principle that the 
business and human rights regulatory obligations of states are grounded in their existing legal 
obligations to “respect, protect and fulfill human rights and fundamental freedom.“ That 
provides a baseline and constraint for states grounded in their own legal relationship to 
international law and its transposition into their domestic legal orders. “Nothing in these 
Guiding Principles should be read as creating new international law obligations, or as limiting 
or undermining any legal obligations a State may have undertaken or be subject to under 
international law with regard to human rights.” Guiding Principles, supra note 1 at 1. But it 
also poses a challenge to states to consider the deficiencies in their domestic legal orders with 
respect to international consensus on the form and scope of human rights obligations 
recognized generally. Id. at ¶ 3 Commentary (“It is equally important for States to review 
whether these laws provide the necessary coverage in light of evolving circumstances and 
whether, together with relevant policies, they provide an environment conducive to business 
respect for human rights.”). 
57. This tendency is evidenced by the approach of the states to the construction of their 
NAPs—one which focuses on the forms of state regulation of companies but ignores any 
consideration of the extent of a state’s duty to protect human rights and the relationship 
between that duty and the failures by a state to transpose international law and norms into their 
domestic legal orders. See supra, notes 42-43 and accompanying text. The Danish NAP 
provides a broader view of the state’s obligations but again the focus is on setting “out clear 
expectations to Danish companies that they must take responsibility to respect human rights 
when operating abroad- especially in developing countries where there can be an increased 
risk of having an adverse impact on human rights.” DANISH NATIONAL ACTION PLAN: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 11 
(March 2014), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/NationalPlans/
Denmark_NationalPlanBHR.pdf. 
58. See, e.g., Joel Slawotsky, Doing Business Around the World: Corporate Liability 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, MICH. ST. L. REV. 1065 (2005); Claudia T. Salazar, Applying 
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poses substantial risks to the GP project and threatens to distract 
States from their principal role as States within transnational and 
embedded systems of human rights regulation. Thus, consider the 
question in a different light, one that starts from the State duty and 
then proceeds to the expression of that duty in the management of its 
economy with fidelity to human rights regimes. From this 
perspective, starting from the regulation of companies and proceeding 
backwards to the law and policy from out of which this regulation 
emerges seems somewhat backwards. Yet, it also suggests the need to 
re-shift the focus of State duty frameworks from the objects to the 
subject of the State duty.59  
Indeed starting from the end point and moving backwards from 
the corporation to the State presents a number of potential perils. 
First, it provides no guidance about methods. Second, it suggests that 
the end of the state duty is merely the development of a corpus of 
corporate human rights related regulation, a conclusion at odds with 
the basic state duty. And most significantly it creates a very certain 
danger of sloppiness that could pervert the structures and premises of 
the GP. Specifically it can suggest that the principal object of the 
Second Pillar is to legislate a national approach to the Second Pillar.60 
In effect, this could turn the State duty into little more than a gateway 
to the nationalization of the second pillar, undermining the 
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International Human Rights Norms in the United States: Holding Multinational Corporations 
Accountable in the United States for International Human Rights Violations under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 111 (2004); Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does 
It—And Why the United States Shouldn’t: The United States’ International Obligation to Hold 
MNCs Accountable for Their Labor Rights Violations Abroad, 11 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 395, 427 
(1999).  
59. For one effort in that direction, see Francesco Francioni, An International Bill of 
Rights Why It Matters, How it Can be Used,  32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 471. Interestingly, Professor 
Francioni’s definition of an international bill of rights; Francioni, supra, 473-76, is different in 
some critical respects from the definition of the International Bill of Human Rights that serves 
as the normative core of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights of the Guiding 
Principle’s Second Pillar.  Guiding Principle ¶ 12. The issue of regulatory coherence is never 
far from the discussion of the state duty. 
60. That appears to be the thrust of the NAPs. See supra notes 42-43, 46 and 
accompanying text. Audrey Gaughran, Director of Global Thematic Issues, Amnesty 
International, remarks delivered during the panel: Closing conversation: Strategic paths 
forward and next steps for the global business and human rights regime, 2014 United Nations 
Forum on Business and Human Rights (Dec. 3, 2014), available at 
http://webtv.un.org/meetings-events/human-rights-council/forum-on-business-and-human-
rights/watch/closing-conversation-strategic-paths-forward-forum-on-business-and-human-
rights-2014/3925402002001 (starting at 32:50 min). 
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autonomous structures of both in the process.61 It also suggests a 
binary that was rejected by the core premises of the GP themselves—
that regulation reflects a set of binary tensions in opposition: (i) 
voluntary versus mandatory regimes, (ii) business versus States, (iii) 
bad or self serving versus collective and serving others, and (iv) 
transnational versus national.62 These oppositions must be resolved in 
favor of law (and within) the State, which would be transformed into 
a vehicle for the application of international norms through their 
transposition into domestic legal orders and from there applied to 
corporate objects. But to state these propositions is to lay bare the 
basis for its rejection.  It suggests that the object of the State duty is to 
conflate its objectives with the responsibilities of business under their 
social norm and international principles frameworks. That is both 
impossible. States may be conduits of international law but they are 
also active participants in policy choices about which international 
norms, if any, they are willing to transpose into binding domestic law 
or influential State policy that informs law making and the 
administration of State. It thus not only conflates two autonomous 
bases for applying human rights regimes but also distracts from the 
principal focus of the First Pillar, which centers on the development 
of formal law and policy structures for human rights and business 
against which business regulation may be robustly effected.63 And in 
any case, it certainly provides little guidance to states.  
It ought to follow, then, that a NAP ought to provide a roadmap 
for getting to the end objective rather than to start with it. Indeed the 
end objective of the State duty to protect human rights ought to be the 
expression of that duty in the management of a State’s political 
economy (with sensitivity to the ideological basis of that system: free 
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61. See infra notes 292-300 and accompanying text. This is a position sometimes taken 
by business elements and perversely has been a foundation for civil society efforts to shift the 
focus of the GPs from its multi-systemic approach to one that is singularly focused on legality 
and the reform of the domestic legal orders of states through treaty making, a subject discussed 
in the Conclusion. 
62. For example, the General Principles of the Guiding Principles state: “[t]hese Guiding 
Principles should be understood as a coherent whole and should be read, individually and 
collectively, in terms of their objective of enhancing standards and practices with regard to 
business and human rights so as to achieve tangible results for affected individuals and 
communities, and thereby also contributing to a socially sustainable globalization.”  
63. See General Principles, supra note 1, 3. The Commentary notes: “[i]t is equally 
important for States to review whether these laws provide the necessary coverage in light of 
evolving circumstances and whether, together with relevant policies, they provide an 
environment conducive to business respect for human rights.” Id. 
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market, capitalist, socialist Marxist-Leninist, etc.).64 But to start at the 
end may well imperil the GP project. The First Pillar instructs States 
that they must, as an initial matter, deal with the structures and 
substance of their own duty to protect human rights before they turn 
that aggregation of duty (expressed in law and policy) outward to 
regulatory objects. Thus every NAP ought to require States to look to 
themselves first. To do otherwise is to risk, by shifting the focus of 
the State duty to companies (and the Second Pillar), veiling the State 
duty and functionally risking privatization of the State duty itself. The 
NAPs focus on general principles, gap filling and risk raises other 
potential issues and complexities as well. First, unlike the Second 
Pillar which imposes a uniform definition of core human rights that 
make up human rights responsibilities of corporations (GP Principle 
12), the First Pillar makes clear that the law and policy based human 
rights duties of States are contextual--that the First Pillar is grounded 
in rejection of any one size fits all premise. Yet, the very nature of 
NAP capacity building functions, especially for States with modest 
resources and little experience, risks the possibility of using NAPs as 
a means of creating unnecessary uniformity among NAPs.  Such 
uniformity would likely tend to mirror the preferences and choices of 
developed states.   
Indeed, there is a strain of thought that suggests—much in the 
manner of regulatory cram-down inherent in the Financial Stability 
Board system65—that NAPs serve in way to provide templates from 
the Global North to the Global South. I can only hope that this 
approach might be avoided, and with it also avoiding creating NAP 
guidance that might be criticized as inadvertently neo-colonialist, and 
favoring a top down approach.  Worse, if the international community 
uses Global North civil society as the means through which to effect 
this cram down, the resulting colonialism becomes a social and 
cultural--and polycentric--one in which the governance preferences of 
international civil society, global donors, and foundations, will be 
leveraged, and disguised as capacity building, substantially and 
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64. Cf. Larry Catá Backer, China’s Corporate Social Responsibility with National 
Characteristics: Coherence and Dissonance with the Global Business and Human Rights 
Project, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS: MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK (Jena Martin 
& Karen E. Bravo eds. forthcoming). 
65. See Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The 
Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board and the Global Governance Order, 
18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 785 (2011). 
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unnecessarily narrow, the choices for Global South States in 
fashioning their compliance with their First Pillar duties. 
 This tendency to veil the preferences of the Global North 
(both through national and non-state governance regimes) in capacity 
building structures might also be seen in the willingness to focus on 
extra-territoriality as an important element of First Pillar 
compliance.66  Beyond its obvious (though sometimes hotly disputed) 
neo-colonialism and its implied acceptance of a power rank ordering 
of States to which the extent of unconstrained sovereignty is tied to 
rank among the “family of nations,” it ought to be applied with great 
caution to remain true to the spirit of the GPs.  GP Principle VII does 
provide for extraterritoriality in those conflict zones where there is an 
absence of governance. There is something to be said about the duty 
of States to apply international law broadly, even without their 
borders.67  But to extend national law into the territory of another state 
because the projecting states takes a different view of law and policy 
than the host state is to undo a century’s worth of crafting global 
political society based on the core principle of the equality of states.  
 This last point raises another important element of gap filling 
under the State duty—the obligation within the First Pillar of States to 
invoke multilateral and concerted effort to undertake their duty to 
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66. Guiding Principle, supra note 1, at 2. The Commentary suggests “strong policy 
reasons” for extraterritoriality, and support this view by reference to international treaties that 
sometimes acknowledge the possibility of its use. Yet it remains principally an instrument 
through which states can project their own domestic legal orders abroad, and absent a coherent 
set of domestic laws so exported, hosts states may well become a territory in which as many 
variations of law may be enforceable, beyond the laws of the host state, as there are foreign 
enterprises operating within its national territory. See, e.g., Sara L. Seck, Unilateral Home 
State Regulation: Imperialism or Tool for Subaltern Resistance?, 46(3) OSGOODE HALL L. J. 
(2008). Beyond that, extraterritoriality has been something of a protean concept.  At once it is 
understood as a means by which powerful states can project their legal structures outward and 
into the territory of other states.  Where that projection targets states that were former colonies 
or which have been part of a traditional relationship of dependence, then it acquires something 
of a character of neo-colonialism. See, e.g., ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY 
AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (2007). Recently, progressives have sought to 
recast extraterritoriality as a tool that can be used to project a set of global consensus values 
and norms by developed states (with higher capacity judiciaries) onto less developed states. 
See, e.g., ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT 67-68 (2011); SIGRUN SKOGLY, BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS: STATES’ HUMAN 
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (2006). 
67. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Sara Seck on the Possibilities and Limits of 
Extraterritoriality in a Corporate Social Responsibility and Human Rights Context, LAW AT 
THE END OF THE DAY (Sept. 6, 2012, 10:49 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2012/09/sara-seck-on-possibilities-and-limits.html; see also infra notes 292-300 and 
accompanying text. 
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protect human rights.  GP Principle 10 quite clearly expresses the 
value of shifting the focus of the state duty from efforts to build and 
apply national laws to companies to the creation of multilateral efforts 
to develop coherent frameworks within which corporations can 
operate between and among states.68 The Commentary to GP X 
stresses the consequential importance of these efforts—coherence in 
the development and application of the GP project.69 This focus also 
may play a significant role in efforts to add to the legal basis of the 
state duty to protect human rights through treaties.70 It would be quite 
useful for the Working Group to determine the way that NAPs may be 
used to foster these activities.71 
 What might this mean for the construction of guidelines for 
NAP development?  First, it suggests that NAPs might usefully serve 
as exercises in internal law and policy mapping. They ought to be 
used as a disciplinary technique through which the state apparatus can 
better know itself in its approaches to human rights (by whatever 
name human rights obligations are known in a particular state).  
Second, it also suggests that efforts be made to provide guidance for 
states to identify where singular and mandatory approaches are not 
necessary but where national context can produce deviation.  It might 
effectuate this by focusing on a listing of human rights-related 
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68.  Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 12 (“Capacity-building and awareness-raising 
through such institutions can play a vital role in helping all States to fulfill their duty to 
protect, including by enabling the sharing of information about challenges and best practices, 
thus promoting more consistent approaches.”). GP 10 Commentary. 
69. Guiding Principles, supra note 1 at 12 (“Greater policy coherence is also needed at 
the international level, including where States participate in multilateral institutions that deal 
with business-related issues, such as international trade and financial institutions. States retain 
their international human rights law obligations when they participate in such institutions.“). 
GP 10 Commentary.   
70. See infra notes 292-300 and accompanying text.  
71. In that context it is worth recalling the insight of Koldo Casla, though for a purpose 
other than where it was directed: 
States play a key role in the process of international norm diffusion when they 
choose to embrace and promote certain standards of adequate behaviour. Yet, 
not all countries are equally important. When it comes to human rights law, 
European States play a key role in drawing the line between acceptability and 
unacceptability. We can safely say that no human rights norm has settled so far 
in spite of the lack of support from Western Europe. At a time when Europe 
muddles through and new powers emerge from the Global South, it is time to 
ask: Will a human rights norm ever emerge regardless of Western support? 
Koldo Casla, Ruggie versus Ecuador: Will a human rights norm ever emerge regardless 
of Western support?, RIGHTS IN CONTEXT DERECHOS EN CONTEXTO (Feb. 9, 2014), 
http://rightsincontext.eu/2014/02/09/ruggie-versus-ecuador-will-a-human-rights-norm-ever-
emerge-regardless-of-western-support/. 
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objectives rather than on the forms by which they objectives are met. 
Thus NAPs might be structured to best effect along functional rather 
than formal lines. These objectives may take any number of forms—
focusing on impact, materiality, and internal capacity building, as 
well as on the institutional objectives necessary to provide a basis for 
these choices. If NAP roadmaps speak to objectives, state NAPs may 
make the policy choices necessary to express these objectives in 
contextually appropriate form. Second, NAPs should also serve as 
roadmaps for consultation and sector specific buy-in. This buy-in is 
necessary not just among national civil society elements and business, 
but also by all of the critical actors within the government.  NAP 
guidance ought to provide toolkits for helping to structure such 
consultations and engagement. Lastly, NAPs ought to serve as a basis 
for determining the boundaries of actions that a state may engage in 
alone--and thus set a baseline for understanding the means by which 
multilateral activities might be effectively used. 
Lastly, the WG will have to decide whether NAPs ought to be 
undertaken as a stand alone project, or whether they ought to be 
embedded in other more conventional documents. The WG has 
embraced the idea of NAPs as statements of evolving strategy 
developed by states.72 I suspect that there ought to be leeway here.73  
The particular conditions of a state may weigh heavily in favor of one 
or the other option.74  The choice of form and placement ought not to 
distract from the critical focus on NAP function.75 As long as NAP 
functionality is preserved, it ought to make little difference where the 
NAP is embedded, or if it stands alone. The danger, though, remains; 
as a mere policy document, prepared by or under the supervision of a 
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72. U.N. WORKING GROUP ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDANCE ON 
NATIONAL ACTION PLANS, ii (Dec. 1, 2014).  
73. Thus, for example, Phase 2 ¶ 6 requires states to identify gaps in state  and business 
implementation of the Guiding Principles. Id. at 7. It provides that “[i]n the process of doing 
so, the Government should outline the various laws, regulations and policies it has in place in 
relation to each of the Guiding Principles addressing States in pillars I and III (Guiding  
Principles 1-10, 25-28, 30 and 31) and identify respective protection gaps.” Id. 
74. Id. at 7.   
75. This point was emphasized in International Corporate Accountability Roundtable and 
Danush Institute for Human Rights, National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights: A 
Toolkit for the Development, Implementation, and Review of State Commitments to Business 
and Human Rights Frameworks (June 2014), available at http://accountabilityroundtable.org/
wp-content/uploads/2014/06/DIHR-ICAR-National-Action-Plans-NAPs-Report3.pdf. A 
human rights NAP will “Stronger legal frameworks, embracing firmer adhesion to 
international norms, more effective incorporation of human rights standards in domestic law, 
enhanced independence of the judiciary, and more effective rule of law.” Id. at 9.  
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single ministry, its value may lie more in the gesture itself, than in 
any significant substantive contribution the NAP might make to the 
reform of the domestic legal order of the State undertaking the NAP.  
B. Trade and Investment Agreements and Procurement 
 One of the most difficult and complex areas in which it is 
necessary to transform the principles of the GP into concrete practice 
and policy is in the areas of trade and investment agreements and in 
the context of government procurement.  Complexity emerges here in 
a number of dimensions. 
 First, trade and investment activities of states are generally 
undertaken in governmental functional “silos.“ These siloed activities 
might be undertaken by officials with very little experience in human 
rights related work and perhaps with even a less developed taste for 
the development of the sort of human rights related sensitivities that 
the NAP project requires.76 The sort of human rights due diligence 
exercised suggested above might be put to good effect in mapping 
those government functional silos which are cross cut by the need for 
human rights sensitivities. NAPs may provide a means of helping 
states determine how to manage mapping of this sort. 
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76. Guiding Principle 8 speaks to the issue of policy coherence. The Commentary speaks 
to the issue of “[h]orizontal policy coherence means supporting and equipping departments 
and agencies, at both the national and subnational levels, that shape business practices – 
including those responsible for corporate law. Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 8 
Commentary.  John Ruggie noted the difficulties and need for policy coherence. A current BIT 
case illustrates the problem. European investors have sued South Africa under binding 
international arbitration, contending that certain provisions of the Black Economic 
Empowerment Act amount to expropriation, for which the investors claim compensation. A 
policy review examined why the Government had agreed to such BIT provisions in the first 
place. It explains that, among other reasons, “the Executive had not been fully apprised of all 
the possible consequences of BITs.” The same is often true for HGAs, which can remain in 
force a half-century. See H.R.C. Report 14th Sess: “Business and Human Rights: Further steps 
toward the operationalization of the ’protect, respect and remedy’ framework“ A/HRC/14/27 
at ¶ 21, pp. 6 (Apr. 9, 2010); see also, e.g., U.N. Sec. Gen., Promotion and Protection of all 
Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to 
Development: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights: 
Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 
7, 2008) [hereinafter Promotion]; see also Piero Foresti, Laura De Carli and others v. Republic 
of South Africa (ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/07/1), (“The more than 2500 bilateral investment 
treaties currently in effect are a case in point. While providing legitimate protection to foreign 
investors, these treaties also permit those investors to take host States to binding international 
arbitration, including for alleged damages resulting from implementation of legislation to 
improve domestic social and environmental standards—even when the legislation applies 
uniformly to all businesses, foreign and domestic.”). 
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 Second, mapping only exposes the problems, but they do not 
solve them. NAPs might, in a capacity building effort, also suggest 
toolkits that might be used by states to work through issues of 
building administrative operations that are coherent--especially in the 
trade and investment areas. To that end, the human rights due 
diligence structures of the Second Pillar77 might be adapted to good 
effect as a process by which states may review trade and investment 
treaties for their human rights effects before they are negotiated to 
finality. The solution may tax a state’s governance capacity in many 
respects, and patience may be required. Changing governmental 
cultures may be as challenging as changing corporate cultures at the 
heart of the GPs.   
 Third, complexity is compounded in the trade and investment 
area because of the way that these conflate booth a substantive 
element (the nature of human rights obligations) and its remedial 
element (Pillar III). That conflation becomes problematic for some 
because the thrust of trade and investment treaties, favoring 
arbitration and other non-judicial remedies, may contradict the 
substantive human rights by opening an avenue through which states 
may constrain their sovereign discretion by opening itself to 
arbitration.  Yet I suspect that this contradiction is more problematic 
in theory than in fact.  It is certainly true that there is a possibility that 
a state may cede its human rights duty through trade and investment 
treaties (and especially through bilateral trade agreements (BITs)).78 
But this is a problem of sloppiness in administrative discipline and 
incoherence in governmental policy rather than a problem inherent in 
trade and investment treaties, or in arbitration to which the state may 
be bound. NAPs guidance might be developed to help states identify 
those points where administrative coordination is necessary and 
perhaps provide guidance through examples of means through which 
administrative structures might be organized to minimize the 
possibility of ceding a state human rights duty to protect through BITs 
and regional trade agreements. 
 Fourth, capacity building is necessary not just among 
government functionaries who work in the specific substantive areas 
affected by human rights.  Administrative segmentation is a large 

77. See Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 17-25.  
78. This was much on the mind of the SRSG as he developed the Protect, Respect and 
Remedy Project and its expression as the GPs. See Promotion, supra notes 50, 76 and 
accompanying text. 
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problem in human rights sensitive activities. “Translators” and “go-
betweens” may be necessary within the state apparatus. It may also be 
necessary to help a state realize the mechanisms necessary to build 
capacity in critical but peripheral areas—embassies, military 
establishments, and national legislatures. NAPs may also suggest that 
way that states may both establish and utilize national human rights 
agencies as a facility to navigate among ministries and between the 
administrative and legislative organs to ensure coordination in the 
state’s duty to protect human rights. 
 Fifth, limiting consideration to trade and investment treaties, 
while important, does not entirely map the universe of economic 
activities in which the state duty to protect human rights comes into 
play.  An important function that tends to be overlooked are state 
activities undertaken through sovereign wealth funds and related 
mechanisms. I have argued elsewhere that sovereign wealth funds 
have the potential to become great instruments of advancing human 
rights through sovereign participation in global markets (as well as in 
internal markets).79 
 NAP guidance might be more useful by building on this 
possibility in constructive ways. This becomes important as 
international financial institutions have increasingly turned to 
sovereign wealth funds as a disciplinary tool for fiscal stability. Thus, 
there have been a growing number of States that have recently 
adopted sovereign wealth funds.80 They increase in importance as 
SWF to SWF deals become a larger force in national development 
strategies through large-scale government projects.81 For NAPs that 
touch on sovereign wealth fund, this may also require efforts at the 
international level to engage the Santiago Principles, a set of 
voluntary principles (similar in their field to the GPs) for best practice 
sovereign wealth fund organization and operation. This in turn may 
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79. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based Transnational 
Rule of Law Building: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets, 29 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 1 (2013). 
80. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Part 21 Sovereign Wealth Fund of Gabon (Fonds 
Souverain de la Republique Gabonaise)”—Reimaging the State in the Global Sphere: An 
Inventory of Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulator and Participant in Global Markets), LAW 
AT THE END OF THE DAY (Mar. 9, 2014, 10:40 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2014/03/part-21-sovereign-wealth-fund-of-gabon.html.  
81. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Part 17 Russian SWFs—Reimaging the State in the 
Global Sphere: An Inventory of Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulator and Participant in 
Global Markets, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Mar. 1, 2014, 11:09 AM), http://
lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/part-17-russian-swfs-reimaging-state-in.html.    
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suggest some utility in dialog between the Working Group and the 
International Forum for Sovereign Wealth Funds.  Lastly, NAPs 
should generally also provide a focus on sovereign investing, in 
whatever form attempted.  
 Sixth, procurement practices present their own set of unique 
problems.82 To some extent a focus on procurement is well 
warranted—procurement activity represents a substantial amount of 
state economic activity.83 It can be used to advance a “changing by 
example“ strategy where the government leads by its own practice 
and takes the rest of society with it.84 Indeed, procurement can be 
understood as an umbrella for privatized governmental services as 
well as a set of economic transactions for the provisions of goods and 
services necessary for the internal operation of the state itself. States, 
thus, can use procurement as a means of providing appropriate 
models for contractual provisions sensitive to human rights issues that 
might influence private sector business behaviors as well. 
 But procurement practices also offer an opportunity for 
polycentric governance.85  Procurement relations are regulated both 
by law and by the contractual provisions of the agreement between 
the state and its contract partners. That interplay is written into the 
black letter of the GPs themselves.  These provide for interplay 
between GP Principle III (regulation by law), GP Principle VI 
(regulation through contract), and GP Principle V (oversight and 
monitoring). The NAP guidance ought to provide states with 
mechanics for combining these multiple obligation points into an 
efficient system of contracting (grounded in law and policy) and with 
effective monitoring systems.  To that end best practices and model 
agreements and rules may be useful. 
The WG might consider guidance in NAPs that would treat 
procurement contracts like BITs. Procurement practices are also 
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82. Cf. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1993). 
83. See, e.g., Phoebe Bolton, Government Procurement As A Policy Tool In South 
Africa, 6 J. PUB. PROCUREMENT 193 (2006). 
84. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, BUYING SOCIAL JUSTICE: EQUALITY, 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, & LEGAL CHANGE (2007) (noting its use in the U.S., U.K., 
Canada and the E.U.); Christopher McCrudden, Using public procurement to achieve social 
outcomes, 28 NAT. RESOURCES F. 257 (2004). 
85. Cf. Tom Campbell, A Human Rights Approach to Developing Voluntary Codes of 
Conduct for Multinational Corporations, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 255, 264 (2006) (“Moreover, 
such external accountability to civil society requires a back-up framework of legal support to 
enable these bodies to fulfill their monitoring and critical functions effectively, a process that 
is now referred to as ‘meta-regulation.’”). 
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tinged with issues that bump up against the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights (in ways that may exceed the state duty to 
protect). Here it might be useful to provide a means of helping 
governments work through an NAP process that may incorporate 
human rights due diligence mechanisms (GP Principles XVII-XXI) as 
a basic part of the contractual provisions in procurement contracts 
(GP Principle VI), which can then serve as a basis for monitoring and 
reporting under GP Principles V and XXI. 
Yet, getting the formal model right does not guarantee good 
practice. NAPs must consider not merely toolkits for good 
procurement practices (as law, policy and contract, perhaps with best 
practice forms and examples) but will also need to provide guidance 
for training and monitoring procurement officers, and procurement 
monitors. These officials may be both administrative officers and 
monitors from the legislative apparatus.  In either case, NAP guidance 
ought to help states work through the issues of procurement in ways 
that are sensitive to the protection of human rights objectives of the 
Second Pillar. In this context, the NAPs ought to consider the 
articulation of detailed human rights impact analyses as a necessary 
element of government contracting. 
 C. Judicial and Non-judicial Mechanisms  
At a theoretical level, many have argued that most states can 
hold multinational enterprises, corporations or individuals to account 
for gross violations of human rights (whatever their scope in each 
state).86 Yet, the principles of the exclusive sovereignty of each state 
over its territory and the respect for the autonomous personality of 
corporations tend to constrain any transnational development of such 
bases of liability.  States may not have the taste for or the power to 
extend their authority beyond their territory, even to locally domiciled 
enterprises. The policy of respect for the legal autonomy of 
enterprises may make it harder to extend liability to an enterprise 
made up of distinct corporations or other entities. At a practical level, 
however, such liability may be even harder to realize. Most states 
have developed substantial limits on access to justice—or more 
prosaically, on access to courts.  The minimal transaction costs of 
accessing courts may be higher than what is feasible for people of 
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86. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Capital Punishment: Corporate Criminal Liability for 
Gross Violations of Human Rights, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 327 (2000-2001). 
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modest means.  In addition, process rules may also functionally limit 
the scope of available remedies. In the context of business and human 
rights, these include strong protections of separate corporate business 
personality,87 forum non conveniens rules in some jurisdictions,88 
standards of proof (especially relating to proof of intent),89 statutes of 
limitations that might substantially reduce the time available for 
investigation before a complaint is filed,90 and choice of law rules.91  
 In addition, many States do not have national human rights 
institutes,92 established on the basis of the Paris Principles.93 
“National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) that comply with the 
principles relating to the status of national institutions, commonly 
known as the Paris Principles, are playing a crucial role in promoting 
and monitoring the effective implementation of international human 
rights standards at the national level, a role which is increasingly 
recognized by the international community.”94 NAPs might serve as a 
useful tool for focusing government on the need for the establishment 
of an NHRI, or, if established, on the need to develop its authority in 
ways that enhance the state’s duty to protect human rights. In 
particular, the NAPs may be a good place to consider enhancing the 
role of NHRIs in effecting remedies, especially for individuals and 
communities that lack means or capacity. Beyond advocacy, they 
might serve as a place to establish a remedial mechanism. 
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87. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, The Autonomous Global Enterprise: On the Role of 
Organizational Law Beyond Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality, 41 TULSA L. J. 541 
(2006). 
88. See, e.g., Jeffrey Davis, Justice Without Borders: Human Rights Cases in U.S. 
Courts, 28 LAW & POL’Y 60, 73-74 (2006). 
89. See, e.g., Stephen Wilkinson, Standards of Proof in International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Fact-Finding and Inquiry Missions, GENEVA ACAD., available at http:// 
www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/Standards%20of%C20proo%20report.pdf.  
90. See, e.g., Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Justice Delayed, Not Denied: Statutory Limitations 
and Human Rights Crimes, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 335 (2012). 
91. See generally PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 
125-176 (2d ed. 2007). 
92. See generally For National Human Rights Institutes. 
93. U.N. OHCHR, Paris Principles: 20 years guiding the work of National Human 
Rights Institutions (May 30, 2013), (“The internationally agreed Paris Principles define the 
role, composition, status and functions of national human rights institutions. NHRIs must 
comply with the Principles which identify their human rights objectives and provide for their 
independence, broad human rights mandate, adequate funding, and an inclusive and 
transparent selection and appointment process. The Principles are broadly accepted as the test 
of an institution’s legitimacy and credibility.”). 
94. U.N. OHCHR, OHCHR and NHRIs,  http://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/nhri/
pages/nhrimain.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).  
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Alternatively, NHRIs may usefully be empowered to bring actions 
before State judiciaries.   
 Beyond this, the NAP process may serve as a useful means of 
considering the value of alternative Second Pillar remedial 
mechanisms—principally the OECD based National Contact Point 
mechanism under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Corporations. Yet this is itself a difficult project, made more difficult 
by the reluctance of many states to fully utilize the potential offered 
by the NCP facility in the context of human rights and corporate 
activity.95  Lastly NAP processes may be a useful framework for 
engaging courts in the process of state-based human rights due 
diligence.  
 D. Due Diligence and Disclosure Requirements  
Due diligence and disclosure have been at the heart of the human 
rights and business conduct project for some time.96 The GPs focus on 
both disclosure (transparency) and due diligence (engagement). That 
focus appears in both the First Pillar’s duty to protect and in the 
Second Pillar’s corporate responsibility to respect human rights. Yet 
the main focus of many GPs appears to be on the corporate obligation 
of due diligence97 and disclosure.98 Due diligence and disclosure by 
states relating to its own duty to protect human rights is substantially 
ignored.  In its place some would argue that the role of disclosure and 
due diligence must center on the role of the state in hard wiring 
(through law) the corporate responsibility to engage in human rights 
due diligence under the Second Pillar.99 But this approach creates 
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95. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Introduction; The U.S. National Contact Point--
Corporate Social Responsibility Between Nationalism, Internationalism and Private Markets 
Based Globalization, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Feb. 1, 2013, 10:59 PM),  
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/introduction-us-national-contact-point.html.  
96. See generally Larry Catá Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law: 
Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 591 (2008). 
97. Guiding Principles, supra note 1 at 17-19. 
98. Guiding Principles, supra note 1 at 20-21. 
99.  See  U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights, Guidance on National 
Action Plans (Dec. 1, 2014):  
Having in mind the actual business and human rights challenges, gaps in 
UNGP implementation by the State, as well as by business enterprises, should 
be identified . . . . The same should be done in regard to business enterprises 
active or based in the country’s territory and their performance in regard to 
pillars II and III (Guiding Principles 11-24 and 28-31). This includes assessing 
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substantial tension and incoherence that may threaten the integrity 
and effectiveness of the GP system itself.  
 The tension and incoherence is embedded in the GP system 
itself—and in the basic incompatibility of the human rights regimes at 
the center of the Second Pillar and those of the First Pillar. This 
incompatibility makes substantially more implausible the possibility 
that states might effectively harden the Guiding Principles’ Second 
Pillar human rights due diligence regimen through national 
legislation.  It makes that effort potentially dangerous to the human 
rights and business enterprise. The danger lies in a simple but 
important difference in normative focus between the First and Second 
Pillars. The First Pillar is careful not to define the core of human 
rights obligations around which the state duty arises. The reason is 
simple—all states sometimes have a very different list of international 
law and norms which it has chosen to transpose into its domestic legal 
order as both externally binding on the state (as against other states) 
and as binding within the state (as law that may be invoked by 
individuals before courts and administrative bodies). It is, for 
example, well known that the United States has refused to ratify or 
transpose into its domestic law a number of key instruments of 
international human rights law that many other states have 
domesticated. In contrast, the Second Pillar concerning corporate 
responsibility is quite clear about the international law and norms that 
make up the core of human rights that enterprises have a 
responsibility to respect.100 
 One can immediately see the problem. The First Pillar adopts 
a traditional and conventional approach to the state duty to protect 
human rights.  That duty is limited by traditional concepts of 
applicability, which states have the power to modify as they see fit 
(except with respect to certain jus cogens obligations, to the extent 
that a state recognizes the concept of jus cogens at any rate).101 The 
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to what extent business enterprises carry out human rights due diligence and 
provide effective remedy through operational-level grievance mechanisms.  
Id. at 7. Yet in doing so it effectively ignores the WPs equally applicable call for 
assessment of legal gaps ion the state’s domestic legal order with respect to human rights. See 
id.  
100. Principle 12 of the Guiding Principles specifies that this minimum universe of 
rights includes the “International Bill of Human Rights and the principles concerning 
fundamental rights set out in the International Labor Organization’s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.” Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
101. See generally Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International 
Law, 60 AM. J. INT’L L. 55 (1966); Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling 
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universe of human rights that a state is obligated to protect under the 
First Pillar, then, can vary substantially from state to state.  Even 
when a state transposes international law into domestic law, it may, 
by reservation, substantially change its content. If that is the case,  it 
is impossible for the state to serve as the regulatory source for efforts 
to harden the Second Pillar disclosure and due diligence rules. One 
cannot use the state to harden the Second Pillar disclosure and due 
diligence requirements because few states have recognized and 
incorporated into their domestic legal orders the entirety of the 
minimum universe of human rights law and norms specified in the 
Second Pillar.  
 What follows? On the one hand efforts to use the state to 
comprehensively regulate the Second Pillar obligations of enterprises 
will fail. They will fail because the scope of the state’s universe of 
human rights is not the same (and usually narrower) than the 
corresponding obligations of corporations to respect human rights. 
This accounts, in part, for the objection of some commentators to the 
project, driven by some global civil society organizations and states 
that would seek to “legalize” second pillar obligations.  For these 
commentators, that efforts amounts to an effort, inadvertent perhaps, 
to shrink the scope of the obligation of corporations to respect human 
rights in transnational economic activities. That, in itself, would undo 
a major foundation of the GPs themselves. 
 On the other hand, for those committed to state regulation of 
corporate obligations, the effort is reduced to piecemeal legislation.  
Thus, for example, there was great rejoicing when the U.S. included 
obligations of disclosure and reporting relating to conflict minerals.102  
That sends a terrible signal to the corporate community, suggesting 
that no part of the Second Pillar has any effect unless it is transposed 
into law.. More importantly, that law may be challenged on the basis 
of the constitutional constraints of the domestic legal order seeking its 
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the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 411 (1989); Anthony 
D’Amato, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s Jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (1990).  
102. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 31 U.S.C. § 
1502 (2010) (discussing the reporting requirement on the sourcing of certain conflict 
minerals); and the rules relating to conflict minerals described in Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249b); see Melvin 
Ayogu & Zenia Lewis, Opinion, Conflict Minerals: An Assessment of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
BROOKINGS.EDU (Oct. 3, 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/
2011/10/03-conflict-minerals-ayogu.   
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imposition.103  The result is the functional evisceration of the Second 
Pillar, not just with respect to disclosure and due diligence, but with 
respect to the scope of the responsibility to respect as well. One need 
not wait for states to develop an autonomous social norm culture of 
respect for human rights among businesses. Fractionalization, 
piecemeal legislative interventions based on momentarily politically 
expedient measures, or national human rights law mapping is not 
likely a responsible answer. 
 If this is the case, what might be a better approach to the due 
diligence and disclosure projects for states under the First Pillar duty 
to protect human rights? In other words, what does this state duty 
project mean for the Working Group as it considers developing its 
roadmap for NAPs, understood as focused establishing a coherent 
framework for operationalizing the state duty? In the first instance, 
such a duty, touches on the larger issue of transparency, which is an 
important normative value in constitutional democratic states, 
especially when that duty is directed toward due diligence and 
disclosure.104 For state action under NAPs, this translates to a need to: 
(1) map its human rights sensitive laws, regulations, and policies 
undergoing a rigorous human rights due diligence process on itself, 
(2) determine the deficiencies in laws, regulations, practices and 
policies that emerge from its due diligence exercise, (3) disclose this 
mapping and deficiency analysis widely and engage in broad based 
consultations within government and among relevant stakeholders; 
(4) develop the capacity to make readily and easily available to the 
most modest of its citizens functionally adequate access to all laws, 
regulations, policies, and practices that touch on the state’s duty to 
protect human rights (and keep these updated), (5) disclose all of the 
state’s relations with its state owned enterprises, the terms of all of its 
procurement agreements, and the practices and interventions related 
to both, and (6) fully disclose all actions, practices and rules relating 
to all forms of sovereign investing. 
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103. Again, consider conflict minerals disclosure, the rules for which were successfully 
challenged in part on the basis of its inconsistency with current interpretations of the U.S. 
Constitution. See Sarah N. Lynch & Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Appeals Court Finds Conflict-
Minerals Rule Violates Free Speech, REUTERS, (April 14, 2014, 5:34 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/14/us-court-sec-conflictminerals-
idUSBREA3D13U20140414.  
104. See generally Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 
(2006); INCREASING TRANSPARENCY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION? (Veerle Deckmyn ed., 2002).   
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 Finally, this approach does not mean that there is no room for 
hardening corporate responsibility through law, especially regarding 
due diligence and disclosure. On the contrary, there may well be 
space for targeted and limited legal structures. But these have to be 
constructed in ways that take advantage of the national context and 
political will of the states concerned. My own sense is that, with the 
understanding that these interventions will necessarily be piecemeal 
or grounded on national human rights mapping, the following 
diligence and reporting frameworks might prove useful: (1) treat 
human rights as a financial contingency that must be reported on 
financial statements already required to be produced under law, and 
explained in the corporate annual report; (2) provide tax incentives for 
human rights remediation that substantially reduces the transaction 
costs and access limitations to courts and judicial remedies; (3) 
require human rights due diligence mechanisms and human rights 
reporting as a listing requirement on all securities exchanges.  
 This basic approach to disclosure and due diligence focuses 
state efforts where it principally belongs—on the state itself and its 
construction and maintenance of an appropriate and functionally 
effective framework for protecting human rights within its 
jurisdiction. It targets due diligence and disclosure on the mechanics 
of state activity, and it allows for targeted legal interventions in ways 
that enhance rather than subvert the Second pillar obligations of 
enterprises. That these might be developed through a NAP would add 
coherence to the project. That the Working Group might build 
capacity in this respect would be a great benefit for the GPs and their 
evolution from theory to practice. This would fall squarely within 
those portions of its mandate emphasized in the 2014 UN Resolution, 
which extends the mandate of the Working Group.105  
 It is with these thoughts in mind that one can conclude this 
section with a better sense of the appropriate scope of the direction of 
the state duty to protect.  More importantly, the consequences of that 
approach can be profound, especially with respect to the mechanics of 
operationalizing the state duty in a coherent and harmonized way—
through treaties, a subject taken up again in Section IV. The Working 
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105. H.R.C., 26th Sess. Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, Human Rights Council, Twenty-sixth session, Agenda item 3, Promotion and 
protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including 
the right to development, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.1 (June 23, 2014).  
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Group has been promoting, quite usefully, a set of mechanisms 
through which states, especially those with modest capacity, might be 
able to develop workable national approaches to the implementation 
of the GPs. Those mechanisms might best be articulated through the 
focused discipline of a national action plan. It is, indeed, only by 
transforming the GP from principle to action, especially 
institutionalized action at the national lever (First Pillar) and 
corporate action (Second Pillar) that the promise of embedding of 
basic human rights sensibilities in economic activity can be realized.  
The effort to create a “how to” for states is itself no small effort, and a 
roadmap for these roadmaps is also necessary. Even these few notes 
on considerations for the development of a roadmap for NAPs 
suggests only a small part of the enormity of the project and the 
capacity deficiencies in states that these might reveal. 
 To the end of producing a substantially functional NAP 
roadmap, this essay has suggested that, while the ultimate object of 
such roadmap, and the NAPs built thereon, is to enable states to better 
regulate corporate human rights behaviors, that ultimate objective 
cannot be achieved until states build their own regulatory and 
administrative capacities. Human rights capacity building is at the 
center of the state duty to protect human rights under the First Pillar  
and requires states to undertake their own assessment of their laws,  
legal cultures, and behaviors relevant to the exercise of human rights-
affirming conduct in the economic and regulatory structures of states.   
NAPs that work toward building that capacity will provide a very 
firm foundation through which states might better fulfill their 
obligations with respect to corporate conduct within their jurisdiction. 
II. ON THE PROBLEM OF THE ENTERPRISE AND THE 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS: 
REGIMES OF REPORTING AND ASSURANCE FRAMEWORKS 
BEYOND THE STATE  
While the focus of Section II was on the state duty to protect 
human rights, and its complexities, this Section turns to the other 
great source of human rights based conduct norms—the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights. The efforts of corporations and 
other business enterprises under the GP are founded on the Second 
Pillar responsibility106 to respect human rights, which requires 
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106. Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 11-24. 
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corporations to “avoid infringing on the human rights of others and 
should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are 
involved“107 as a specific expression of the general obligation of 
corporations “as specialized organs of society performing specialized 
functions, required to comply with all applicable laws and to respect 
human rights.“108  They also extend to the responsibility to “provide 
for or cooperate in [the] remediation [of adverse human rights 
impacts] through legitimate processes“109 and to the Third Pillar 
obligation to “establish or participate in effective operational-level 
grievance mechanisms for individuals and communities who may be 
adversely impacted.“110 “Operational-level grievance mechanisms 
perform two key functions regarding the responsibility of business 
enterprises to respect human rights. First, they support the 
identification of adverse human rights impacts as a part of an 
enterprise’s ongoing human rights due diligence . . . . . Second, these 
mechanisms make it possible for grievances, once identified, to be 
addressed and for adverse impacts to be remediated early and directly 
by the business enterprise, thereby preventing harms from 
compounding and grievances from escalating.”111  
 Unlike the state duty to protect human rights elaborated  
under the First Pillar, the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights is better and more specifically defined.  Yet that responsibility 
is complicated by the inherent polycentricity of the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights.112 On the one hand, all 
enterprises share a basic obligation to comply with applicable laws.113  
The determination of the extent of legal obligation where more than 
one set of national laws may apply (as would be the case where a host 
state may apply its laws extraterritorially to reach corporate conduct 
that may also be subject to regulation by the law of the host state) 
remains unsettled and its resolution may sometimes be complex. Still, 
the basic obligation is both well understood and uncontroversial.   
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107. Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 11. 
108. Id. supra note 1, at 1. 
109. Id. supra note 1, at 22. 
110. Id. supra note 1, at 29. 
111. Id. supra note 1, at 31-32. 
112. See generally Larry Catá Backer, Governance Without Government: An Overview 
and Application of Interactions Between Law-State and Governance-Corporate Systems, in 
Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority, in AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 87-123 
(Günther Handl, Joachim Zekoll & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2012). 
113. Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 23. 
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On the other hand, the responsibility to respect human rights 
extends beyond a mere obligation to comply with law. While the laws 
of the place where enterprises operate always serve as a baseline, the 
responsibility to respect is also and simultaneously grounded in a set 
of transnational norms that are themselves derived from international 
law and norms originally applicable under public law principles to 
states.114 The basis of that connection to international normative 
standards is embedded in the GPs.115 
 Though the obligation to comply with applicable law is highly 
contextual and may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, “business 
enterprises have the same responsibility to respect human rights 
wherever they operate.“116 This autonomous responsibility, grounded 
in international norms, also informs the nature of the corporate 
obligation to comply with local law.  The responsibility to respect 
human rights includes seeking “ways to honour the principles of 
internationally recognized human rights when faced with conflicting 
requirements”.117  
 The GPs specify three distinct though related undertakings of 
enterprises that seek to meet their responsibility to respect human 
rights.118  The GPs then provide substantial guidance for undertaking 
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114. This is what John Ruggie referenced as a social license to operate. See John G. 
Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Right, MIT 
INNOVATIONS 189-212 (2008), available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/
itgg.2008.3.2.18. (“Whereas governments define the scope of legal compliance, the broader 
scope of the responsibility to respect is defined by social expectations—as part of what is 
sometimes called a company’s social license to operate.”); see generally Kathleen M. Wilburn 
& Ralph Wilburn, Achieving Social License To Operate Using Stakeholder Theory, 4 J. INT’L 
BUS. ETHICS 2, 3-16 (2011); Larry Catá Backer, Transnational Corporations’ Outward 
Expression of Inward Self-Constitution: The Enforcement of Human Rights by Apple, Inc., 20 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 805, 812 (2013). 
115.  Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 12: 
“The responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights refers to 
internationally recognized human rights —understood, at a minimum, as those 
expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights and the principles 
concerning fundamental rights set out in the International Labour 
Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.”  
116. Id. supra note 1, at 23. 
117. Id. supra note 1, at 23. 
118.  
These include: 
(a) A policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights; 
 (b) A human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and 
account for how they address their impacts on human rights; 
(c) Processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts 
they cause or to which they contribute. 
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the development of conforming policy commitments, on the structure 
of human rights, due diligence and the general approach to corporate 
based remediation.119 These form the heart of the manner through 
which corporations respect human rights in their operations. 
 But principles are not instructions in the appropriate way in 
which to undertake the crafting of policy commitments, the 
organization and operation of appropriately structured and routinized 
human rights due diligence, or the deployment of adequate 
remediation facilities.  Moreover, principles, even those as tightly 
drafted as the GPs, require application--and in the application, 
interpretation of the GPs in context. Recently, important elements of 
civil society have undertaken a variety of approaches to the 
development of institutional and routinized structures within which 
corporations could seamlessly comply with their Second Pillar 
responsibilities. In some cases, corporations have sought to develop 
their own structures and to routinize them within their corporate 
cultures.120  In many other cases, civil society, transnational private 
and international public organizations have sought to provide 
guidance.121 
 As these dynamics develop, the inevitable question arises as 
to what good reporting on company alignment with the UN Guiding 
Principles--and good assurance of such reports--should involve. Some 
existing reporting standards offer a number of human rights-related 
indicators–notably the Global Reporting Initiative’s new G4 
framework.122 So do various social audit protocols and sustainability 
assurance standards. And some industry or issueǦspecific initiatives 
have developed more detailed indicators in those focal areas. 
However, none of these initiatives, alone or in combination, cover the 
breadth of a company’s responsibility to respect human rights as set 
out in the UN Guiding Principles.123  
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Id. supra note 1, at 15. 
119. Id. supra note 1, at 16-23. 
120. See, e.g., Supplier 2014 Responsibility Progress Report, APPLE (January 2014) 
available at https://www.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/
pdf/Apple_SR_2014_Progress_Report.pdf.  
121. See, e.g., ISO 26000 - Social Responsibility, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR 
STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 
2015). 
122. See generally G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, GLOBAL REPORTING 
INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/g4/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 
25, 2015).  
123. See RAFI Framing Document, supra note 13 at 5. 
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 The proliferation of standards and approaches has produced 
markets in compliance.124 They have also produced what Tim Mohin, 
the CSR director for Sun Microsystems, has called “collaboratition,“ 
which “means that companies can and will collaborate on CSR efforts 
when that is more efficient, while continuing to compete on their 
signature CSR programs.“125 That is a perhaps necessary consequence 
of the anarchic nature of the transnational sector in which the 
corporate responsibility is situated.126 Yet that center-less autonomy 
of norm system universes, even those revolving around a principles 
based center like the GP, has consequences. Where markets 
commodify the mechanisms of communication, then the possibility of 
speaking across platforms becomes more difficult: 
This creates a risk to the clarity, predictability and global 
convergence that the UN Guiding Principles have fostered regarding 
companies’ baseline responsibility for human rights. Without a 
widely-accepted framework for reporting company implementation of 
the Guiding Principles, and a parallel framework for assuring such 
reports, we can expect to see a proliferation of interpretations in 
practice. Reports and audits will become highly divergent in their 
reflection of the Guiding Principles. This will undermine the ability of 
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124. See, e.g., Laura Albareda, CSR governance innovation: standard competition-
collaboration dynamic, 13 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 551–68 (2013).  
125. Tim Mohin, The Top Ten Trends for CSR in 2012, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2012, 4:27 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012/01/18/the-top-10-trends-in-csr-
for-2012/. He explains the nature of the societal context in which non-state CSR governance is 
forged and operates beyond law and legal structures: 
As CSR becomes more of a differentiator, companies will both compete and 
collaborate on CSR issues . . . The numerous CSR ratings, together with data 
from the Reputation Institute’s 2011 “Pulse Survey,“ which indicate that CSR 
is responsible for more than 40% of a company’s reputation, lay the basis for 
CSR competition. On the other hand, there are a plethora of associations and 
multi stakeholder networks that foster collaboration on CSR topics. Groups 
like the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition demonstrate how 
competitors can partner on CSR issues like conflict minerals. Why would 
they? Such issues are so massive that working together is clearly more 
efficient. On the other end of the spectrum are initiatives like GE’s 
ecomagination program, which furthers competitive advantage.  
Id. at 5.  
126. See Larry Catá Backer, A Conversation About Polycentricity in Governance 
Systems Beyond the State, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Nov. 11, 2013), available at 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/a-conversation-about-polycentricity-in.html. See 
generally Larry Catá Backer, Governance Polycentrism—Hierarchy and Order Without 
Government in Business and Human Rights Regulation (Coalition for Peace and Ethics, 
Working Paper No. 1/1, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2373734.  
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the Guiding Principles to continue to drive improvements in practice, 
which in turn will be to the detriment of human rights, society and 
business.127 This permits the elaboration of a horizontal and anarchic 
system of rulemaking outside the state and legal spheres, centered on 
the disciplining of business behaviors that touch on human rights 
detrimental actions.128 Yet this is a system that might also require the 
sort of connectivity and harmonization—the coherence129—that 
parallels the need for similar coordination among states seeking to 
operationalize their duty to protect human rights.130  Together, the 
efforts at coherence within state and enterprise systems drive the 
overall aim of the Guiding Principles—coordination among state, 
international and private governance systems around the single 
normative framework of human rights.131  
  Even as market-based anarchy appears to have begun to 
threaten the operationalization of a cohesive corporate responsibility 
scheme to respect human rights, a number of efforts have been 
underway to serve a bridging role. Two are considered here as 
examples, the insights of which might be more broadly applied.  The 
first is the Human Rights Reporting and Assurance Frameworks 
Initiative (“RAFI”),132 developed by Shift133 and supported by the UN 
Working Group.134 This project developed a draft framework and 
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127. RAFI Framing Document, supra note 13, at 5.   
128. See generally Larry Catá Backer, The Concept of Constitutionalization and the 
Multi-Corporate Enterprise in the 21st Century (Coal. for Peace & Ethics, Working Paper No. 
6/1, 2014) (positing system of polycentric constitutionalism).  
129. See Guiding Principles supra note 1, at 16. 
130. Id. supra note 1, at 8-10. 
131. Id.  supra note 1, General Principles (coherence), 3 (coordination), 4 (coordination), 
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(coordination), 23 (coordination), 24 (coordination), 28 (coordination), 30 (coherence).  For a 
theoretical approach to the notion of inter-systemic coordination generally, see Gunther 
Teubner, The Corporate Codes of Multinationals: Company Constitutions Beyond Corporate 
Governance and Co-Determination, in CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LAWS OF CONFLICT IN 
EUROPE AND BEYOND: PATTERNS OF SUPRANATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL 
JURIDIFICATION (Rainer Nickel ed., 2009). 
132. Human Rights Reporting and Assurance Frameworks Initiative Overview, SHIFT 
PROJECT, http://www.shiftproject.org/project/human-rights-reporting-and-assurance-
frameworks-initiative-rafi.  
133. Who We Are, SHIFT PROJECT, http://www.shiftproject.org/page/who-we-are (“Shift 
is an independent, non-profit center for business and human rights practice. We help 
governments, businesses and their stakeholders put the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights into practice. We share our learning by developing public guidance 
materials that help build the field globally.”).  
134. U.N. Working Group Statement on its Support for the Reporting and Assurance 
Frameworks Initiative Led by Shift, Mazars and the Human Rights Resource Centre for 
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implementation guide in 2014135 and launched its first final version 
(with embedded implementation guidance) in early 2015.136 The 
second is the disclosure systems being attempted through securities 
exchanges, and specifically on the world federation of exchanges 
creation of a sustainability working group and the proposal to require 
extra financial disclosure. Each is discussed in turn. 
A. RAFI 
The RAFI project seeks to address this gap that is emerging as 
enterprises (and to some extent states) seek to contribute to the 
operationalization of the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights by providing a variety of discretionary or mandatory 
(piecemeal mostly) frameworks within which respecting human rights 
may be undertaken, measured, reported and assessed. The RAFI 
project team represents a coordinated effort of civil society actors. It 
includes Shift and Mazars, who work in liaison with the Human 
Rights Resource Centre. Shift is an independent, non-profit center for 
business and human rights practice. Mazars is a global provider of 
audit, accountancy, tax, legal and advisory services. The Human 
Rights Resource Centre is a non-profit academic center working on 
human rights issues in the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(“ASEAN“).  RAFI is overseen and steered by an Eminent Persons 
Group (“EPG“), which consists of leaders from a broad range of 
stakeholder backgrounds, globally and in ASEAN.137  
 The RAFI team explained that its fundamental purpose was to 
confront the risk that the proliferation of methodologies to Second 

ASEAN, SHIFT PROJECT, http://shiftproject.org/sites/default/files/
UN%20Working%20Group%20Support%20for%20RAFI.pdf. 
135. The draft Framework was published as UN Guiding Principles Reporting 
Framework (November 2014), available at http://business-humanrights.org/sites/
default/files/documents/DRAFT_UNGPReportingFramework_11Nov2014.pdf. The draft 
implementation guide was made available as The UN Guiding Principles Reporting 
Framework, Implementation Guide (Nov. 2014), available at http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/DRAFT_UNGPReportingImplementationGuide
_11Nov2014.pdf. 
136. UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework With Implementation Guidance 
(2015).  
137. The Business and Human Rights Reporting and Assurance Frameworks Initiative 
(“RAFI“) Project Framing Document, supra note 14, at 10.  The latest reported work of the 
RAFI team was summarized in Human Rights Reporting and Assurance Framework Initiative 
RAFI), Takeaways From Consultations, August–December 2014, available at http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/GPRF_TakeawaysFromFall2014_29Jan2015.pdf.  
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Pillar compliance would create “a risk to the clarity, predictability and 
global convergence that the UN Guiding Principles have fostered. . . . 
Reports and audits will become highly divergent [and] will undermine 
the ability of the Guiding Principles to continue to drive 
improvements in practice . . . .”138 In place of this market for 
methodology, RAFI would offer a “widely-accepted framework for 
reporting company implementation of the Guiding Principles, and a 
parallel framework for assuring such reports“139 to address the gap 
between principle and practice under the Second Pillar. Much of 
RAFI’s work has been widely distributed, in line with its objective of 
seeking wide consultation and engagement in developing its reporting 
framework.140 Those consultations have suggested parameters within 
which critical stakeholders have considered the issue of human rights 
reporting, its objectives, utility, scope, and most importantly, its 
form.141 Those parameters included concerns about transparency, 
inclusiveness and seriousness of its consultation process, the utility of 
collaboration with other civil society organizations working on 
similar reporting systems, the scope of the RAFI framework as setting 
a floor rather than a ceiling for reporting and assurance, fear of non-
compliance with overly complex reporting (a difficulty of other 
systems), and the importance of developing uniform parameters for 
reporting.142 

138. Id. at 5. 
139. Id. 
140. See RAFI Publishes 2013 Take Away Document and Next Steps for 2014, HUMAN 
RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE (Apr. 6, 2014), http://hrrca.org/content/rafi-publishes-2013-take-
away-document-and-next-steps-2014 (outlining the project’s next steps for the first half of 
2014, including consultation plans).   
141. The Take-Aways from RAFI Consultations in 2013, SHIFT PROJECT (February 
2014), http://hrrca.org/system/files/RAFIConsultations2013Takeaways.pdf. 
142. Id. Also particularly helpful, as part of that work, was a Report produced by Shift in 
June 2014. See generally SHIFT PROJECT, EVIDENCE OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE RELEVANT 
TO THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, (2014). Draft Paper for 
Discussion (June 2014). Its purpose was to “inform understanding of how companies currently 
report on their human rights performance, and how this maps against the UN Guiding 
Principles.” Id. at 4. It considered “the extent to which company disclosure covers information 
relevant to the ‘headline statement’ of each Guiding Principle [and an] assessment of 
supporting evidence provided by the company for . . . each Guiding Principle.” Id. at 5-6. The 
Report concluded, without much surprise, that though leading companies committed to human 
rights due diligence have been building disclosure and reporting systems, much of what is 
disclosed is general and policy based, the disclosure frameworks do not focus well on 
reporting specific impacts and responses, and virtually none reported on shareholder 
engagement. Id. at 6-7. 
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 The UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework (the 
Reporting Framework)143 launched on February 24, 2015 in 
London.144 The contours of the reporting and assurance framework 
were discernible in preliminary form by late 2014.145  These closely 
follow the GP “headlines“ for Principles 16 through 23 with 
additional layers adding detail reflecting industry specific private 
efforts at implementation of the Guiding Principles.146  
At one level, the Reporting Framework is just what it says: a 
framework to help companies report on their human rights performance 
in line with the UN Guiding Principles. Yet it is also much more than 
that. . . . This Reporting Framework represents an indispensable 
contribution to the collective effort to embed the UN Guiding 
Principles into practice.147 
Indeed, this focus of the Reporting Framework has been well 
explained by its developers.148 RAFI reporting standards would be 
organized around “(1) the content of the Human Rights Statement, (2) 
the identification and assessment of salient human rights risks, (3) 
public disclosure of how specific risks or impacts are addressed, and 
(4) additional information in the Statement.“149  Its objectives focus 
on structuring information disclosure that is meaningful to 
stakeholders, viable for companies to follow, and that helps foster 

143. UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework With Implementation Guidance 
(2015), available at http://www.ungpreporting.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/
UNGuidingPrinciplesReportingFramework_withimplementationguidance_Feb2015.pdf.  
144. Shift Press Release, First Comprehensive Guidance for Companies on Human 
Rights Reporting Launches in London, Feb. 24, 2015, available at http://shiftproject.org/
news/first-comprehensive-guidance-companies-human-rights-reporting-launches-london.  
145. UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework (November 2014), available at  
http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/
DRAFT_UNGPReportingFramework_11Nov2014.pdf. 
146. See Draft Reporting Framework, supra note 135, at 4 (“The Reporting Framework 
is grounded in the Guiding Principles and aligned with the structure and content of the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights.  It is also designed to dovetail with various 
industry  and issue specific initiatives related to business and human rights that provide some 
clarity about how the Guiding Principles apply in specific situations, as well as with broader 
reporting frameworks in the non-financial or integrated reporting fields.”). 
147. Reporting Framework, supra note 136, at 6. 
148. See Mazars & Shift, DEVELOPING GLOBAL STANDARDS FOR THE REPORTING AND 
ASSURANCE OF COMPANY ALIGNMENT WITH THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 22 (2013), available at http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/developing-global-standards-discussion-
paper.pdf (“Annex B—Elements of the Guiding Principles for Inclusion in the Reporting and 
Assurance Standards”).  
149. Id. at 10-13. 
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internal dialog.150  One level of detail might include the specific areas 
or sectors of greatest interest to the reporting entity.  Another layer 
might add detail about the mechanics of human rights due diligence. 
An additional layer might provide space for relating specifics with 
respects to systems, claims and remediation. This would permit a 
heightened level of specificity about a reporting entity’s human rights 
policy, the way in which the policy is embedded within its operations, 
and disclosure relating (at least in the aggregate) to the entity’s salient 
human rights risks and their mitigation efforts.  The structure would 
also encourage assessment of the entity’s human rights mechanics. 
The assurance review is tied to the focus of reporting.151  
This three-layer information hourglass disclosure system (Parts 
A-C of the Reporting Framework) forms the heart of the reporting 
structure contemplated under the draft RAFI framework.152  Part A is 
composed of two sections, each framed as a single general question 
followed by additional questions designed to elicit further detail.153  
Part B is meant to serve as a filter, in the sense that it is meant to 
narrow the focus to those of material significance to the reporting 
entity.154  Part C is then designed to elicit more comprehensive 
reporting on this more narrowly framed set of human rights related 
issues and to lead the entity to effective responses.155 The relationship 
among parts A, B, and C are also discussed.156  
The overarching questions in Parts A and C focus on general, 
relevant information on the company’s efforts to meet its obligations 
to respect human rights. They are designed to enable responses form 
any company, including small companies and those at a relatively 
early stage in the process.157 And like the Guiding Principles 
themselves, the bare bones question-disclosure framework of the 
Reporting Framework is augmented by a far more detailed set of 
commentaries that are meant to provide guidance for the guidance of 

150. Draft Reporting Framework, supra note 135, at 4-5. 
151. Mazers & Shift, supra note 148, at 13-18. 
152. Reporting Framework, supra note 136, at 7-8; Draft Reporting Framework, supra 
note 144, at 5-6. 
153. Reporting Framework, supra note 136, at 9. 
154. Id. at 9.  
155. Id. at 9-10. 
156. Id. at 20 
157. Reporting Framework, supra note 136, at 19; see also Draft Reporting Framework, 
supra note 135, at 5 (“Responding to these eight questions, in addition to the information 
requirement under Part B, is the basic threshold for using the UN Guiding Principles Reporting 
Framework.”). 
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the Reporting Framework.158 The focus is on narrative exposition—no 
effort is undertaken (nor might it be possible) to adapt the qualitative 
disclosure framework of the Reporting Framework to the disciplines 
of standard financial reporting.159  Indeed, the quantification 
necessary for financial statement reporting itself might pose the 
danger of reducing human rights due diligence to little more than an 
extension of risk reporting. That, in turn, would potentially reduce the 
value of the Reporting Framework as a means of focusing on 
identification prevention and remediation which constitute an 
important objective of the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights.      
 It is far too early to tell how the RAFI Reporting Framework 
will advance uniformity and aid harmony is systems of reporting 
human rights due diligence under the GPs.  To date only a few, but 
very important industry business culture leaders, have signaled their 
willingness to produce RAFI Framework reports.160 More 
significantly, perhaps, investors, with $3.91 trillion assets under 
management signed an “Investor Letter” in which they indicated their 
support of the RAFI Reporting Framework.161   
Still, it is not too early, in this context, to usefully consider the 
form and challenges that face important projects like the RAFI 
Reporting Framework. The RAFI project is both necessary and 
realistic.  It provides a mechanism that makes it easier for enterprises 
to develop and apply a robust human rights management system that 
are relatively uniform.  RAFI intends its reporting platforms to serve 
as one of many non-financial reporting systems to “complement 
existing and on-going initiatives in this field.” Yet at the same time, 
the RAFI initiative could be incorporated as a component of a 
company’s financial reporting, through which RAFI reporting “could 

158. See Reporting Framework, supra note 136, at 26-113. .  
159. The Reporting Framework notes three overarching objectives: (1) to provide 
guidance on how best to engage in human rights due diligence reporting; (2) to ensure the 
feasibility of Framework disclosure; and (3) to help companies improve internal management 
systems. Id. at 14. 
160. Press Release, First Comprehensive Guidance for Companies on Human Rights 
Reporting Launches in London, Shift (Feb. 24, 2015), available at http://shiftproject.org/
news/first-comprehensive-guidance-companies-human-rights-reporting-launches-london 
(“Companies from five different industries are early adopters of the Guiding Principles 
Reporting Framework, including Unilever—the first adopter—plus Ericsson, H&M, Nestlé 
and Newmont.”).  
161. UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework Investor Statement (Feb. 24, 2015), 
available at http://www.ungpreporting.org/early-adopters/investor-statement/.  
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contribute to, and become a part of, integrated reporting through 
which companies communicate holistically on what may impact the 
sustainable value of the business.”162  
 RAFI desires to tailor its reporting mechanisms to encourage 
reporting that is useful, but that appears to be both driven from the top 
(reflecting the GPs insight that ownership of human rights 
management at the very top of supply chains is critical to the success 
of the operationalization of a corporation’s second pillar 
responsibilities), but also be sensitive to the needs (in terms of 
information and system focus) of internal, external, private and 
governmental stakeholders. Simultaneously, the RAFI reporting 
mechanisms are meant to provide a means for improving reporting.  It 
is useful as a gateway reporting and management system creation, but 
also encourages the development of more sophisticated and 
responsive systems (and the reporting that goes along with it). RAFI 
is focused on narrative reporting, paralleling in some small respect, 
the approach to management’s reporting of its internal oversight 
systems under the Sarbanes Oxley Act Section 404.163  But this does 
not rule of quantitative measures (though it is unlikely that civil 
society will view quantitative measures without suspicion). The 
objective is clear and straightforward: “global and widely accepted 
process for companies to demonstrate whether their policies and 
processes are indeed aligned with the UN Guiding Principles and 
therefore capable of meeting their responsibility to respect human 
rights.”164  
 Yet that goal of developing robust human rights management 
and reporting systems, and the value of the mechanisms developed 
through RAFI, are not undertaken in a vacuum. On one hand, RAFI’s 
success will have to be measured against the mechanisms, now deeply 
embedded in corporate and governmental cultures (of assessment and 
management) of financial reporting.  There is no consensus yet on the 
forms and level of standardization, routinization and cultural 
embeddedness in business and human rights reporting and assessment 
of the sort that has effectively turned financial reporting as the most 

162. Mazars & Shift, supra note 149, at 9.  
163. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745), enacted July 30, 
2002), 15 U.S.C. 7262.  
164. Mazars & Shift, supra note 148, at 5. 
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legitimate basis of “seeing“ a corporation,165 and the effects on which 
remain the most critical element of corporate decision making is the 
“gold standard“ against which any sort of non-financial organizational 
reporting, assessment and decisions will be measured. Such 
measurement will occur whatever the preferences of the human rights 
community, of civil society, of businesses, of governments or others.  
On the other hand, RAFI’s project is not limited to the same finite and 
discernable set of stakeholder communities to which financial 
reporting and management are directed. Global civil society, impacted 
communities, indigenous groups and others, with little direct interest 
in or use for financial reporting and management, have a significant 
stake in human rights management systems.  And while financial 
reporting is directed outwards primarily to the investor and consumer 
communities, and to the state, human rights management has more of 
a public character in its scope and nature.  Thus, the approach to 
human rights management reporting, even those grounded in the GPs, 
will have to share a similar set of functional objectives of financial 
reporting with respect to legitimacy, cultural embeddedness and 
effectiveness.   
 More importantly, human rights management reporting and 
assessment systems must be comparable. That is, one should be able 
to read and compare the reports of a variety of companies relating to 
their human rights management the way that one can compare the 
financial performance of the same companies. This is the key 
principle of accounting conventions and foundational to any system 
of reporting.166 It may be structured formally in distinct ways that 
reflect the character, nature and scope of the needs of the 
communities served by or through such reporting. But the goal of 

165. See Peter Hardi, Gergely Radacsi & Katharina Schmitt, Evaluations of CSR 
Performance and Impact as Seen by Key Actors Other Than Business at 12 (CSR Impact 
Working Paper 3, 2012), available at http://csr-impact.eu/
index.php?eID=tx_mpcsrimpactdl&tx_mpcsrimpactdl[dlid]=15 (noting that “[t]he assessment 
of the economic, social and environmental outcomes and impacts of CSR activities is sporadic. 
There are almost no independent measurement tools and quantitative methods applied. If 
assessments are performed, these are done by reviewing managers’ personal observations, or 
publicly available company communications (such as CR reports).”). 
166. Obaidullah Jan, Comparability Principle, ACCOUNTING EXPLAINED,  
http://accountingexplained.com/financial/principles/comparability (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) 
(“Comparability is one of the key qualities which accounting information must possess. 
Accounting information is comparable when accounting standards and policies are applied 
consistently from one period to another and from one region to another. The characteristic of 
comparability of financial statements is important because it allows us to compare a set of 
financial statements with those of prior periods and those of other companies.”). 
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producing functionally equivalent objectives (over the long term) 
through the development of formally distinct mechanics may prove 
challenging. The RAFI consultation process, however, appeared to 
point to a consensus against significant efforts in the direction of 
quantitative standardization.167  More importantly, they appeared 
focused on the objective of transparency and the Reporting 
Framework as a process enhancer toward deeper engagement by 
companies with the Guiding Principles.168 
 The challenge may be heightened where overarching 
objectives, system mechanics, and focus on audience may appear to 
be unresolved.  The Draft Reporting Framework retains a focus on 
“headline statement coverage“169 as the core element of reporting in 
the form of the core question-specifics format of Sections A and C.170 
“The opening “headline statement” to each Guiding Principle defines 
the overarching expectations of that particular Principle, and is then 
followed by bullet-pointed sub-elements that provide further detail on 
specific expectations.”171 Yet this approach may produce lots of paper 
and very few specifics and perhaps even less incentive toward 
implementation.172  More robust reporting may be resisted because of 

167. Takeaways From Consultation’s August–December 2014, available at  
http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/GPRF_TakeawaysFromFall2014_29Jan2015.pdf. “The  
focus  on  questions  rather  than  indicators  is  the  right  one,  given  the  challenges  in   
designing  indicators  that  are  meaningful  across  all  companies  in  all  sectors  and  
contexts. The draft questions  are  generally  sound  and  sensible,  while  some  would  benefit  
from  simpler  language.” Id. at 1. 
168. Thus the Reporting Framework noted: 
It provides a practical set of questions and information requirements through 
which they can engage a company in a substantive and meaningful 
conversation about how it meets its responsibility to respect human rights. 
Company reporting against the Framework should provide a robust basis to 
deepen and focus those conversations, offering insights into a company’s 
culture, strategy and approach to key stakeholder relationships. 
Reporting Framework, supra note 136, at 14. 
169. Evidence of Corporate Disclosure relevant to the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights 5 (Shift Project, Draft Paper for Discussion, 2014).  
170. The UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework, Implementation Guide, supra 
note 142. 
171. Evidence of Corporate Disclosure supra note 169, at 5. 
172. Consider in this light, for example, the supporting guidance for the Draft Reporting 
Framework Part C.1, The UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework, Implementation 
Guide, supra note 135, 34.  This is not to suggest that the resulting danger of paper compliance 
is fatal.  The Draft Reporting Framework does seek to manage companies into compliance 
through the more specific questions that follow the general one.  But the Reporting Framework 
does little to augment the disciplinary focus of the exercise in reporting.  That, in part, results 
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the risk of increased liability. Yet the reporting framework itself is 
quite sensitive to risk, especially in the context of developing a 
hierarchy of salience in reporting.173 Moreover, a headline statement 
approach may also suggest that the bulk of reporting focus on central 
office practices and policies, rather than on reporting and 
implementation that focuses on the operational levels down the 
supply chain. Moreover, a focus on leadership companies, while 
necessary to create cultural buy-in and further a lead-by-example 
from the top, may conceal the reality that most smaller and less well-
resourced enterprises may have little incentive to report and fewer 
resources to report well. 
 There is also a tendency among some members of civil 
society and industry to disaggregate the GPs and view them as a set of 
tools for assessing specific risks.174 The GPs may be understood, in 
this light, as little more than a template through which companies 
recognize their responsibility to avoid specific wrongs contextually 
driven by corporate operations. That approach avoids the need to 
understand the GPs as systemic in quality, and thus, as a template for 
framing general reporting and human rights management systems. As 
a consequence, human rights reporting can be disaggregated and 
reporting undertaken in a piecemeal way. This can produce little by 
way of information that may be assessed across companies or even 
internally against a general standard.  It also misunderstands the 
fundamental nature of the Second Pillar in ways that could undo its 
value. Related to this approach is the idea that reports, in scope and 
focus, ought to be driven by investors, civil society, or other noisy 
stakeholders.  This also has a tendency to fracture reporting (as well 
as the human rights management program) of an enterprise, and 
reshape human rights due diligence from an active obligation of 

from the reluctance by the framers of the Reporting Framework to develop meaningful 
measures for comparability across reporting companies.  See supra note 164.    
173. Reporting Framework, supra 142, at 24. 
174. See generally Matteo Tonello, The Business Case for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
FINANCIAL REGULATION (June 26, 2011, 11:46 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2011/06/26/the-business-case-for-corporate-social-responsibility/#5 (“As the SRI 
movement becomes more influential, CSR theories are shifting away from an orientation on 
ethics (or altruistic rationale) and embracing a performance-driven orientation. In addition, 
analysis of the value generated by CSR has moved from the macro to the organizational level, 
where the effects of CSR on firm financial performance are directly experienced.”); see also 
Min-Dong Paul Lee, A Review of the Theories of Corporate Social Responsibility: Its 
Evolutionary Path and the Road Ahead, 10 INT’L J. MGMT. REV. 53, 53-73 (2008).  
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business to a passive response to its loudest and most effective critics. 
There is no “system” in this approach; here is just a more broadly 
applied “active shareholder“ template. 
 Fracture and human rights wrongs “hunting” inherent in these 
approaches may also produce perverse results.  On the part of 
downstream supply chain partners, it produces a tendency to hide 
wrongs and the sort of quasi adversarial relationships one sometimes 
sees with aggressive downstream human rights and behavior control 
systems that require constant monitoring (and which reduces the 
likelihood that downstream managers will internalize human rights 
sensitive norms, which ought to be the object of these systems). On 
the part of home state operations, it produces a sense that these 
“wrongs” occur only in less developed, foreign, and downstream 
partners. As a consequence, there is less pressure to turn human rights 
management systems inward to review operations at the home state or 
in the human rights management system itself.  On the part of system 
development, it creates a tension between a systems operation 
approach that is legislative in structure (human rights problems ought 
to be deduced and managed through rules that are enforced through  
policing) versus ones that are understood as judicial in structure 
(problems in practice serve as the basis for determining what is going 
wrong and its resolution provides a means for determining how to fix 
the problem). Companies use a bit of both, but the RAFI 
methodologies might be pushed to order these approaches in ways 
that may not reflect the diverse realities of enterprise operations in 
context. 
 What an outsider looking at the RAFI process as an exercise 
in identifying and solving an institutional behavior management 
problem, the diverse challenges may produce is a tendency toward the 
creation of pretty but sloppy systems. Worse, these systems may not 
be capable of comparison across companies. These difficulties may 
pose significant obstacles to the realistic attainment of the goals of 
coherence in the sense of furthering a routinization and 
institutionalization of systemic human rights management and 
reporting that is more than the aggregate of responses to the 
occasional human rights wrong.175 They will appear to please 

175. In effect, standardization, the principle advance of projects like RAFI, may be 
attained at the cost of furthering movement toward the routinization of reporting, and thus f the 
possibility of its institutionalization. The idea sounds in the mass production of law—
something that produces legal certainty and the routine necessary to augment legitimacy and 
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everyone consulted, but effectively provide little other than optics that 
are most useful to corporate marketing and shareholder relations 
departments at the head office of global corporations.  Indeed, from 
the summaries of prior consultations, it appears that pleasing all 
powerful constituencies may well produce contradictory movements 
that make construction of a management system nearly impossible. 
These unresolved binaries, with strong advocates on both sides, make 
progress difficult and compromise even more so. The failure to 
resolve these conflicts, or to explode them by making them irrelevant 
for reporting and system construction, revolve around a number of 
key issues  in reporting structures creation and ultimately human 
rights management systems.176  Taken together, these tensions suggest 
the greatest challenge to the RAFI project.  Many of these systemic 
tensions may not be reconciled; some might be avoided.  But a failure 
to acknowledge these tensions, and the choices they suggest, may 
weaken the project.  It will certainly produce sloppiness in system 
construction, sloppiness that may substantially weaken the 
effectiveness of the RAFI reporting systems (and thus weakened, also 
weaken the assurance function). At worst, unresolved, these tensions 
might become contradictions that may produce a slide toward 
systemic paralysis--designed to please everyone by making all things 
possible, the system will please no one, and lose its cohesion as 
effective and normative coherent reporting system that encourages 
and improves reporting—and assurance/audit.  
 The RAFI Reporting Framework may expose another 
tension..  Reporting conflates two distinct regulatory systems within 
which the corporate enterprise must conform its behavior.  The first is 
the law system of the states, home and host, in which it operates 
directly or indirectly through supply chain relationships. These 
obligations are legally binding but fragmented; and they may not be 
consistent across the operational scope of corporate activity within 

reliance; cf. Sara Berglund, Ieva Gange, & Frans van Waarden, Mass Production of Law. 
Routinization in the Transposition of European Directives: A Sociological-Institutionalist 
Account, 13 J. EUROPEAN PUB. POL’Y, 692, 692-716 (2006); Nathalie Lazaric, Routinization 
and Memorization of Tasks in a Workshop: The Case of the Introduction of ISO Norms, 14 
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 873, 873-96 (2005).  
176. These systemic tensions include: (1) operation philosophy: economic project versus 
cultural project; (2) operation mechanics: problem solving versus top down and legislative; (3) 
responsiveness: reactive (wrongs driven) versus proactive (rules driven); (4) Output 
Projection: effective internal responses (data generation and assessment) versus transparency 
(information dissemination); and (5) functional targets: practical behaviors inside and outside 
enterprise versus ideology of human rights. 
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their value chains. Each jurisdiction will have formally distinct law 
and policy frameworks (some but not all of which may converge in 
the human rights field), only some of which may derive from national 
implementation of international obligations. Each jurisdiction may 
also impose distinct reporting regimes on some, but not all, human 
rights related activities.  RAFI must incorporate these distinct and 
diverse reporting and normative obligations as part of its framework 
to make it in fact workable.  The failure to make space for this may 
reduce its value to enterprises already obliged under a growing 
number of fragmented and distinct reporting and normative regimes 
seeping into the enterprise’s Second Pillar responsibilities from the 
First Pillar state duty. The second are those human rights obligations 
that are derived from the responsibility to respect and touch on 
corporate social norms rather than legal obligations territorially 
constrained. These, as the GPs make clear, are transnational 
responsibilities and ought to infuse all decision making, irrespective 
of local legal and policy cultures.177    
 Taken together, the drive toward reporting uniformity might 
mask operational fragmentation, which may diminish the power of the 
reporting framework. Alternatively, reporting uniformity in the face 
of distinct legal, policy and normative regimes may fragment 
reporting itself, so that it may be impossible to speak of a RAFI 
report, but instead to speak to RAFI Framework Reporting 
approaches to multi-purpose and multi-sourced reports.  That might 
encourage universalism and harmonization at the level of Second 
Pillar norm responsibilities, but may also shear away law and policy 
based reporting in ways that diminish the overall power of a human 
rights management system. Yet that may be the only recourse under a 
First Pillar system that produces substantial variation in national legal 
orders approaches to their duty to protect human rights based on their 
national constitutions and norm systems (overlaid to varying degrees 
with international law and norms). In both cases, reporting that is 
pretty but (necessarily) sloppy is likely. Neither alternative is 
inevitable, but a solution requires both recognition of the issue and an 
effort to seek resolution, perhaps through categorical reporting 
mechanisms. 
 An equally thorny set of issues arises within the context of 
actually developing the framework within which reporting may be 

177. See, e.g., Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 25-26. 
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structured. Some of these issues arise in the shadow of the robustness 
and cultural predominance of financial reporting. For example, the 
issue of materiality is central to the culture of financial reporting and 
it has been built into the law of liability for disclosure fraud.  The 
RAFI Reporting Framework seeks to avoid materiality in favor of 
salience, an important distinction that reminds enterprises that the 
object of reporting is not merely external, but also points to internal 
effects. Salience is not a term of art well known in the business 
community and it will take some effort to naturalize the concept 
among reporting entities.178  Even then, the possibility that salience 
will be treated as an outward vectored form of materiality (material to 
those who experience human rights wrongs, for example) should not 
be underestimated. 
 In addition, the core objective of routinization and 
standardization may substantially affect the form and content of the 
RAFI Reporting Framework as it actually be applied by adhering 
enterprises.179  The tendency of some in civil society is to make the 
RAFI narrative as extensive and detailed as possible. The tendency of 
enterprises might be to offer disclosure that limits risk (in the manner 
of approaching conventional disclosure for securities regulation 
purposes).   Related to that is the notion that such narrative reporting 
ought to disclose specific instances of wrongs that might then be 
assessed for the appropriateness of remediation or response.  Yet the 
utility of the reporting device as a means of internal control may 
suggest a distinct approach.  In any case, overwriting narrative 
requirements can easily make the RAFI framework too complex or 
burdensome to be useful. It may please its drafters but it will produce 
disincentives to comply. Standardization and routinization is a 
contextually driven exercise that requires some certainty about core 
reporting framework issues: (1) which companies will actually engage 
in reporting (inducement function); (2) which stakeholders are going 
to read the reports (utility function); (3) which reporting frameworks 
are compatible with a RAFI system (syncing function); and (4) which 
approach to reporting will induce internalization of human rights 
norms (naturalization function).  These components of routinization 

178. See generally Adam Sulkowski & Sandra Waddock, Beyond Sustainability 
Reporting: Integrated Reporting Is Practiced, Required, and More Would Be Better, 10 U. ST. 
THOMAS L. J. 1060, 1060-85 (2013). 
179. See, e.g., Alfred Tat-Kei Ho, Reinventing Local Governments and E-Government 
Initiatives, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 434, 434-44 (2002) (in the public sphere). 
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are themselves dependent on corporate incentive structures for 
systems creation: there are few incentives for companies to engage in 
the operation of management systems unless they are required to by 
law, it is in their financial interests, or it forms part of their business 
culture. This was well understood in the development of the Second 
Pillar; the insights are as applicable to operational system building. 
Thus, if the RAFI , or a system like it, is to build a human rights 
reporting system that furthers the core objectives of the GPs and the 
Second Pillar it is well worth considering the character of the 
construct for the reporting framework. In that context, the RAFI 
framework construct might be usefully understood as a prequel to the 
harder task of building a rule of law (non-state based) system of rules 
for the disciplining of business conduct with human rights detrimental 
effects in the social sphere. Its key value is as a mapping exercise 
rather than as anything like a due diligence manual. In that respect, 
RAFI responds to the same impulse, and ought to respond in the same 
way, as the Working Group’s construction of sound NAP 
frameworks, also as self-reflexive mapping projects on which action 
and governance decisions may be made.  
 RAFI might be understood as developing mapping structures 
in five distinct and critically important areas that parallel the mapping 
categories of the NAP process for states. The first involves mapping 
internal company policy (derived from law/norms/culture/policy).  
This substance mapping serves a chapeau function from which the 
structure of the details of RAFI reporting follows. The second 
consists of mapping external manifestation/effects/occurrences 
(salience or material risk silos). This form or objective mapping 
serves a routing function for reporting. The third focuses on mapping 
operationalization (through rules and response procedures). This 
process mapping serves to routinize and describe the systems for 
application of company policy in context. The fourth considers 
mapping results or objectives manifestation universe 
(remedies/transparency/engagement). This process mapping serves to 
document end of cycle activity, the products of which affect the 
mapping of policy, manifestation and operationalization (mapping 1, 
2 and 3). This forms an operational closed loop that can then build on 
itself through constant application and reapplication of the normative 
universe that fuels the project. The last recasts mapping as storytelling 
(discussion of actual events). This cultural mapping serves to 
normalize the mapping process and its behavior habits, making it 
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easier to internalize its normative structures within the corporation’s 
institutions and the values of its employees.180  
Reconceiving RAFI-style programs as mapping permits the 
manifestation of that application as an exercise in solidifying 
abstraction through systems construction; that is, mapping is not a 
descriptive exercise, it is essentially normative. That normative 
element drives the RAFI project to a focus on institutional framing 
through its reporting structures, on the government of human rights, 
its law (policy), its apparatus (institutional structure), its process and 
its remedial universe. Focusing reporting on the government of 
human rights within enterprises avoids the rights versus risks debates 
on reporting organization by reframing the discussion as an institution 
building project.181 Rights, risks and action specificity become second 
order events. It also avoids the heroic approach to human rights 
reporting.182 As an institutional and communal exercise, it avoids the 
idea, far too often cultivated in some governance cultures, of reducing 
human rights compliance to individual effort--to the hero, the whistle 
blower, the critical person. Building institutional cultures broadens 
the class of people heavily invested in human rights projects within 

180. Yet, if the RAFI project construct is usefully understood as a complex mapping 
exercise, then the project might benefit from fine-tuning to emphasize the mapping-organizing 
premise.  To that end, two organizing principles may be useful: First, mapping is a process of 
aggregation.  That is a useful way of understanding the salience standard (though not 
necessarily its object), and the lack of focus on granularity in reporting. Even storytelling is 
not an exercise in granularity; storytelling is a means to cultural normalization. Cf. Jeffrey S. 
Henderson, CSR as Mythology (UGSM -Monarch Business School, Working Paper Vol. 1, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1608682  (arguing that 
“true social change will not take place until society replaces the anachronistic archetypical 
myths that reinforce the orientation of conflict based economic systems for those of a more 
cooperative form“ Id., at 3); Herman Agunis & Ante Glavas, Embedded Versus Peripheral 
Corporate Social Responsibility: Psychological Foundations, 6 INDUSTRIAL AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 314, 314-332 (2013). 
181. I have been considering the power of disclosure as a tool to socialize business 
entities and others into compliance with emerging social norms (that is, to behavior rules that 
are not transposed into the laws of nation-states necessarily, but which have binding effect 
within social, economic and other communities). See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, From Moral 
Obligation to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of 
Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 591, 591-653 (2008). 
182. See, e.g., Tarja Ketola, Taming the Shadow: Corporate Responsibility in a Jungian 
Context, 15 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 199, 199-209 (2008); cf. Trish Ruebottom, 
The Microstructures of Rhetorical Strategy in Social Entrepreneurship: Building Legitimacy 
through Heroes and Villains, 28 J. BUS. VENTURING 98, 98-116 (2013). Even the heroic can 
be routinized within governance systems. Barbara G. Myerhoff & William R. Larson, The 
Doctor as Culture Hero: The Routinization of Charisma, 24 HUM. ORG. 188, 188-91 (2008). 
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enterprises. Lastly, it avoids dissimulation through narrative and 
obfuscation through data harvesting approaches. 
B. Disclosure Systems and Securities Exchanges: On the World 
Federation of Exchanges Creation of a Sustainability Working Group 
and the Proposal to Require Extra Financial Disclosure  
While RAFI provides an excellent example of the strength and 
character of societally constituted efforts to produce framing 
mechanics for corporate compliance with its responsibilities to respect 
human rights, it is also well-known that both state and non-state 
regulatory systems play an essential role.183 Among the most 
important players in the context of structuring markets and business 
behavior expectations are the securities exchanges vital to the 
operation of global investment.  The community of exchanges 
structures its operations and disciplines its members through an 
organization of exchanges, the World Federation of Exchanges.  It is 
self-described as “the trade association for the operators of regulated 
financial exchanges. With more than 60 members from around the 
globe, the WFE develops and promotes standards in markets, 
supporting reform in the regulation of OTC derivatives markets, 
international cooperation and coordination among regulators. WFE 
exchanges are home to more than 45,000 listed companies.“184 It thus 
operates both in the social sphere (as a source of cultural norms) and 
regulatory sphere (as the source of governance norms and structures) 
that can substantially affect the way in which enterprises operate and 
understand themselves. “The WFE is a central reference point for the 
securities industry, and for exchanges themselves. We offer member 
guidance in their business strategies, and in the improvement and 
harmonization of their management practices.“185  

183. See, e.g., Inge-Johanne Sand, Polycontextuality as an Alternative to 
Constitutionalism, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE & CONSTITUTIONALISM 41-65 
(Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner eds., 2004); Gunther Teubner, The 
Corporate Codes of Multinationals: Company Constitutions Beyond Corporate Governance 
and Co-Determination, in CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LAWS OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND 
BEYOND: PATTERNS OF SUPRANATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL JURIDIFICATION (Rainer 
Nickel ed., 2009). 
184. WFE, WFE Appoints Nandini Sukumar as New Chief Administrative Officer, May 
30, 2014, http://www.world-exchanges.org/insight/reports/wfe-appoints-nandini-sukumar-
new-chief-administrative-officer.  
185. About Us, What We Do, WFE http://www.world-exchanges.org/about-wfe/what-
we-do (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).  
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 This role is particularly significant because of the way it 
affects the operating cultures of enterprises which seek to trade their 
securities on these exchanges. Though ostensibly targeting disclosure 
relating to price,186 the decisions about what must be disclosed, and 
how and where those disclosures must be made, and to whom, play an 
enormously important role in the way enterprises approach their 
operations.187 Each item of disclosure serves as an ingredient in the 
pricing calculus for buyers and sellers.  If a matter is to be disclosed, 
then it is to serve a role in pricing securities.  If it is not, its role in 
share pricing is more diffuse. Disclosure and, consequently, securities 
pricing, might serve as a key mode of incorporating human rights 
sensibilities (and sustainability) more robustly into the operating 
calculus of enterprises.188 The techniques of societal 
constitutionalism, might be brought to bear to change the governance 
universe within which enterprises operate without the need to 
undertake a massive multilateral negotiation that might ultimately 
lead to the modification of the domestic legal orders of the states 
necessary to effect global changes in behavior.189 
 To that end, in March 2014, the “World Federation of 
Exchanges (WFE) formed a new sustainability working group at its 
Working Committee meeting in Mumbai. The new Sustainability 
Working Group is comprised of representatives from a diverse array 
of global stock exchanges with a mandate to build consensus on the 
purpose, practicality, and materiality of Environmental, Social, and 
Governance (ESG) data.“190  They explained that “[t]his new working 
group will continue that mission, undertake original research, 
publicize its findings, promote the debate over ESG issues among the 
members of WFE and make recommendations to the member 

186. See About Us, Mission, WFE http://www.world-exchanges.org/about-wfe/our-
mission (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). 
187. Cf. Larry Catá Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure 
Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 591, 
591-653 (2008). 
188. See Larry Catá Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations and the 
Governance Effects of Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101, 136-141 
(2008). 
189. See Larry Catá Backer, Transparency Between Norm, Technique and Property in 
International Law and Governance—The Example of Corporate Disclosure Regimes and 
Environmental Impacts, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 31-48 (2013). 
190. WFE Launches Sustainability Working Group, WORLD FEDERATION OF 
EXCHANGES (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.world-exchanges.org/insight/reports/wfe-launches-
sustainability-working-group.  
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exchanges.“191 The exchanges that initially committed to participate 
include an interesting global mix.192  
 The work of the Sustainability Working Group (SWG) kicked 
into higher gear in March 2014, when Ceres,193 “in collaboration with 
BlackRock and other major institutional investors, today announced 
an initiative to engage global stock exchanges via the World 
Federation of Exchanges (WFE) on a possible uniform reporting 
standard for sustainability reporting by all exchange members.“194 
The proposal was developed by Ceres’ Investor Network on Climate 
Risk, “and its member-driven Investor Initiative for Sustainable 
Exchanges. Over 100 institutional investors from six continents 
helped shape the listing standards proposal.“195  The Investor Listing 
Standards Proposal: Recommendations for Stock Exchange 
Requirements on Corporate Sustainability Reporting,196 focused on 
corporate sustainability reporting that means to institutionalize, 
routinize and harmonize sustainability reporting so that it might be 
used, like current financial reporting, to evaluate companies for 
purposes of making investment and other pricing related decisions. 
Sustainability (also denominated Environmental Social and 
Governance or “ESG”) is understood broadly to encompass 
“disclosures involving communities, human rights, resource inputs 
and outputs, climate change, discrimination and diversity issues, labor 
rights and employee relations, safety product integrity and privacy, 

191. Id. (“The WFE and its 60 member exchanges have long engaged the investment and 
regulatory community on the efficacy of ESG disclosures in this effort, as part of its overall 
commitment to creating transparency and fairness in the capital markets.”). 
192. See id. (explaining that the exchanges include BM&FBOVESPA, Borsa Istanbul, 
Bursa Malaysia, CBOE, CME Group, Deutsche Börse, IntercontinentalExchange/NYSE, 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, NASDAQ OMX, National Stock Exchange of India, and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange). 
193. See About Us, CERES http://www.ceres.org/ (“Ceres is a non-profit organization 
advocating for sustainability leadership. We mobilize a powerful network of investors, 
companies and public interest groups to accelerate and expand the adoption of sustainable 
business practices and solutions to build a healthy global economy.”). 
194. World’s Largest Investors Launch Effort to Engage Global Stock Exchanges on 
Sustainability Reporting Standard for Companies, CERES (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://www.ceres.org/press/press-releases/world2019s-largest-investors-launch-effort-to-
engage-global-stock-exchanges-on-sustainability-reporting-standard-for-companies.  
195. Id. 
196. See Investor Initiative for Sustainable Exchanges, Investor Listing Standards 
Proposal: Recommendations for Stock Exchange Requirements on Corporate Sustainability 
Reporting, CERES (March 2014), http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/investor-listing-
standards-proposal-recommendations-for-stock-exchange-requirements-on-corporate-
sustainability-reporting.  
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supply chain and sub-contracting ethics, governance oversight 
pertaining to these categories and related issues.”197  
The Proposed Listing Standard is as broad as the categories it 
means to subsume within its disclosure regimes.198 But there is a 
resonance with RAFI. It has three parts.  The first requires the 
preparation of an “ESG Materiality Assessment.”199  The second 
requires disclosure on each of 10 categories of ESG categories, using 
a comply-or-explain approach. Disclosures are to include qualitative 
and quantitative markers, with reference to policies, procedures, 
management systems and related corporate initiatives, with existing 
performance data, discussion of legal proceedings and anticipated 
controversies and strategic opportunities.200 The third requires 
preparation of an ESG performance index utilizing the Global 
Content Index or equivalent.201 
 The Investor Listing Proposal is likely to receive some 
substantial push back from businesses, and there may be some effort 
by the largest companies potentially affected to enlist the aid of their 
home states to derail this specific project. This tactic has been used 
before, unfortunately quite effectively.202 Enter the UN Global 
Compact. The UNGC reported on this effort to have the WFE adopt a 
proposal requiring extra financial disclosure for WFE listed 
companies. The UNGC is now looking to gather business input on the 
draft submission.203 Whatever the fate of this initiative, it is an 
important indication of the value of disclosure in the 
operationalization of the Second Pillar responsibility to respect human 
rights, and the centrality of the institutions that help structure 
economic markets in the development and disciplining of those 
efforts. Whatever the outcome of this societal governance effort, the 
issue of harmonization of securities disclosure is also a major public 

197. Id. at 3. 
198. See id. at 8-14. 
199. Id. at 8-10. 
200. See id. at 10-12. 
201. See id. at 12-14. 
202. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The 
United Nation’s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as Harbinger of 
Corporate Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287-389 
(2006). 
203. UNGC, Press Release, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/
Financial_markets/Investor_Listing_Standards_Proposal_GC_Feedback_Form.pdf.  
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law project.204 And, indeed, multilateral action by securities 
exchanges through the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions adds a layer of public participation to the markets 
driven disclosure regimes of private sector efforts.205  
 Taken together, it is clear that RAFI and the Proposed Listing 
Standard present to distinct but related efforts to operationalize the 
Second Pillar responsibility to respect human rights in ways that 
promote changes to institutional cultures and naturalization of those 
changes within corporate work forces. They both suggest the 
importance of the structures of governance in the construction of such 
systems—that is, the centrality of standardization, routinization and 
comparability in the development of systems of human rights due 
diligence that will be effective.  But those very characteristics lend 
themselves as easily to legality as they do to societally (non-state) 
constructed governance. Yet they also require more than efforts aimed 
at developing conversation, or discussion designed to increase 
transparency and engagement (as laudable as both of these goals may 
be). That suggests the possibilities for coordination built into the GPs.  
Like the NAP process and the state duty, the building of strong and 
effective human rights due diligence systems, systems that are as 
useful internally as they are for stakeholders seeking to hold 
enterprises accountable in societal space, face similar challenges.  
Both are especially susceptible to rhetorical flourish and symbolic 
gesture in place of the hard work of legislative drafting or governance 
construction.  
It is clear that both sloppiness and an inclination to mold projects 
to please everybody can substantially weaken them—whether the 
legal project of the state duty or the societal governance project of the 
responsibility to respect human rights. Rigor and well articulated 
goals that target institution building around mechanics for exercising, 

204. See, e.g., Uri Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rues 
in the Global Market, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 241 (1997); Hal S. Scott, 
Internationalization of Primary Public Securities Markets, Law and Contemporary Problems 
63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71-104 (2000); Eric C. Chafee, Finishing the Race to the 
Bottom: An Argument for the Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities 
Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1581 (2010).  
205. Among its objectives, the IOSCO is to “cooperate in developing, implementing and 
promoting adherence to internationally recognized and consistent standards of regulation, 
oversight and enforcement in order to protect investors, maintain fair, efficient and transparent 
markets, and seek to address systemic risks.” IOSCO, Objectives, available at 
http://www.iosco.org/about/; see also Roberta S. Karmel, IOSCO’s Response to the Financial 
Crisis, March 2012,  available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2025115.  
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in practice, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights may 
well produce a significant advance to the routinization of human 
rights, like financial considerations, as basic to corporate decision 
making.  Yet it is only the form of that rigor, rather than its practice 
that now have taken center stage.  This may be a necessary 
intermediate step.  One gets companies used to narrative descriptions 
of a kind similar to those already required in U.S: securities law 
disclosure.  Perhaps one can then move toward comparable 
methodologies that mirror those of financial reporting.  But it is too 
early to tell.  It is to the challenges thus posed that the great challenge 
of the last half of the second decade of the 21st century will face—the 
effort to legalize the GPs within the normative system of international 
law. It is to this amalgamating inclination that this article turns next.  
III.  AND A TREATY TO BIND THEM ALL—ON PROSPECTS AND 
OBSTACLES TO MOVING FROM THE GPS TO A MULTILATERAL 
TREATY FRAMEWORK, A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 
 At the time of the endorsement of the GPs, John Ruggie 
explained that the GPs represented the end of the beginning of the 
development of an integrated and polycentric system that in the 
aggregate could produce a coherent framework for the regulation of 
the human rights impacting behaviors of enterprises.  It was to be 
centered on states in the area of public law, states were to coordinate 
their approaches to domestic regulation through the instrumentalities 
of multilateral engagement through human rights centered 
international organizations.  But societally constituted 
organizations—enterprises and non-state organizations would also 
coordinate their governance systems through participation in the 
construction of customary premises and behavior expectations for 
human rights impacting behaviors.  Thus central to the 
operationalization of the GPs, and fundamental to internal coherence 
in positing a complex polycentric governance universe within which 
the business of human rights would be disciplined, were the 
international organizations that would serve as the central nexus point 
for the development of the substantive and procedural norms that 
would coordinate all these systems.  
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 But a large group of civil society actors had been critical of 
the thrust of the GPs at the time of their endorsement.206  They argued 
that the GPs were critically deficient, and chose the moment of the 
adoption of the draft GPs in early 2011, as the time to publicly declare 
their disagreement with the fundamental thrust of the GP project.207 
They threatened that “[u]nless addressed, these gaps will prevent the 
Guiding Principles from effectively advancing corporate 
responsibility and accountability for human rights and so may fail to 
gain widespread acceptance by civil society.“208  The Joint statement 
included some of the most influential members of conventional global 
civil society—those organizations with tremendous global influence, 
and whose members were deeply embedded within networks of 
political elites.209 They tend to be treated as the incarnated 
manifestation of mass society and in this sense can exercise 
representative political authority in the national and international 
planes,210 though not without criticism.211   
 These civil society actors distilled their critique of the GP 
project in five overarching categories.  The first included a number of 
failures “provide clear recommendations to States consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights standards.”212  The failure 
was global and to some extent foreshadowed the approach of the 
current calls for an international business and human rights treaty, 
especially the emphasis on the GP failure to oblige states to enforce a 
well described set of international norms against transnational 
corporations and to change their domestic legal orders to comply. The 

206. See Joint Civil Society, Statement on the Draft Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, January 2011, available at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/
Joint_CSO_Statement_on_GPs.pdf.  
207. See id.  
208. Id. 
209. See id. The Joint statement was produced by a coalition that included Amnesty 
International, CIDSE, ESCR-Net, the International Federation for Human Rights, Human 
Rights Watch, International Commission of Jurists and RAID. Id. 
210. See TERRY MACDONALD, GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY: POWER AND 
REPRESENTATION BEYOND LIBERAL STATES (2008); Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Is Global 
Democracy Possible?, 17 EU. J. INT’L REL. 519-42 (2011), Larry Catá Backer, Governance 
Polycentrism-Hierarchy and Order Without Government in Business and Human Rights 
Regulation (Coalition for Peace and Ethics, Working Paper No. 1/1 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2373734. 
211. See, e.g., Jonas Tallberg & Anders Uhlin, Civil Society and Global Democracy: An 
Assessment, in GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES (Daniele 
Archibugi, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi & Raffaele Marchetti, eds 2011). 
212. Joint Civil Society, supra note 148, at 1-2.  
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second faulted the GPs for their failures to “address the governance 
gaps created by globalization.“213 This is a curious critique and 
suggests not so much a failure to understand the thrust of John 
Ruggie’s work between 2006 and 2011, as it declares a rejection of 
the foundational structure of the GPs and their recognition of the 
importance of societally created governance systems as an important 
element in gap filling consistent with the logic of globalization and its 
effects on the distribution of power among state and non-state 
actors.214 For these (mostly Western oriented) civil society actors the 
answer was clear, though appalling from the perspective of history—a 
mandatory extraterritoriality imposed on powerful states to act as 
global agents through their national courts to discipline multinationals 
operating anywhere.215  More interesting still, these civil society 
elements sought to use their critique to advance another agenda—the 
inversion of traditional international law, positing a character of 
globalization as a global system in which international law was 
superior to and binding against national law, and in which states had 
an overarching obligation to apply international law (irrespective it 
appears to their willingness to accede to them).216  The third, in a 

213. Id. at 2. 
214. Larry Catá Backer, Governance Polycentrism—Hierarchy and Order Without 
Government in Business and Human Rights Regulation (2014); Coalition for Peace and Ethics 
Working Paper No. 1/1 (2014) (“As a consequence, the problem of societally constituted 
organisms in a world once populated entirely by states and their creatures operating through 
the rigidly organized hierarchies of law, may well be the intrusion of law where it is neither 
necessary nor natural.”).   
215. Joint Civil Society Statement on the draft Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, supra note 19, at 2 (“They should more specifically provide guidance for States 
to ensure that companies under their jurisdiction do not contribute to human rights abuses at 
home or abroad.”); see also Sara Seck, Kiobel and the E-word: Reflections on Transnational 
Environmental Responsibility in an Interconnected World, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY 
(July 5, 2013, 11:25 AM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/sara-seck-on-kiobel-and-
e-word.html; Daniel Augenstein and David Kinley, When Human Rights ‘Responsibilities’ 
become ‘Duties’: The Extra Territorial Obligations of states that Bind Corporations, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
RESPECT? 271-94 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz, eds., 2013). The GPs were grounded on a 
more benign form of extraterritoriality, though one that from the perspective of this author, 
still over-empowered powerful states to project their domestic laws and agendas on weaker 
states perpetuating systems of vertical power arrangements among states; see Olivier 
DeSchutter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as a Tool for the Human Rights Accountability of 
Transnational Corporations, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF LOUVAIN AND THE COLLEGE OF 
EUROPE (Dec. 22, 2006), available at http://cridho.uclouvain.be/
documents/Working.Papers/ExtraterrRep22.12.06.pdf.  
216. Joint Civil Society Statement on the draft Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, supra note 9, at 2.  This, at its best, might mirror the emerging school of Third 
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sense inconsistent with the second, demanded the GPs be “clearer on 
the human rights responsibilities of business enterprises.“217  But the 
extent of this independent obligation appeared to focus on the need 
for these enterprises to consult with indigenous communities beyond 
any such obligation imposed by states through national law. The 
fourth, focused on the failures of the GP to provide more robust 
substantive guidance for a set of particularly vulnerable groups.218 
That the rights and protections of these groups might be the subject of 
other international treaty and norm making efforts appeared to have 
little effect on the critique. Rather, the GPs were faulted precisely 
because they failed to serve as a nodal point of those efforts.219 The 
fifth and last set of critiques focused on deficiencies in the remedial 
pillar of the GPs.220 Civil society argued that irrespective of national 
law, international law established a substantial set of rights to remedy 
that ought to have been more forcefully articulated in the GPs. “Much 
of the focus of the guidance is on grievance mechanisms, with only a 
single principle (24) dealing with judicial mechanisms, which are 
necessarily at the core, albeit not the sole modality, of effective 
remedies under international law.“221  The remedial provisions of the 
GPs were also faulted for their failure to demand states modify their 
dispute resolution systems to reduce obstacles to effective remedies 
“with a view to ensuring victims can exercise their right to an 
effective remedy, including by reducing or eliminating financial 
barriers to access public justice mechanisms, and by making the 
functioning and decisions of those mechanisms more effective.“222  

World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL).  At its worst it represents a form of neo-
colonialism, which the GPs sought to avoid.  See also, Larry Catá Backer, Sara Seck on the 
Possibilities and Limits of Extraterritoriality in a Corporate Social Responsibility and Human 
Rights Context, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Sept. 6, 2012, 10:49 PM) 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/sara-seck-on-possibilities-and-limits.html.  
217. Joint Civil Society Statement on the draft Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, supra note 19, at 2.   
218. Id. (including women, children, Indigenous peoples, and human rights defenders).  
219. Id. “Clear guidance should be provided by drawing from recommendations made by 
other UN Special Procedures, UN human rights treaty bodies, the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues, and the International Labor Organization. Further, explicit reference to 
relevant treaties and declarations, should be included in the Guiding Principles when 
articulating the sources of internationally recognized human rights that companies must 
respect (Principle 12 a).” Id. 
220. Id. at 3.  
221. Id. (“The Guiding Principles should take a comprehensive approach to remedies 
that include: effective legally-binding remedies consistent with international human rights law; 
voluntary mechanisms; and other measures that will ensure adequate remedies.“ Id.). 
222. Id. 
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 This focus on the details of civil society grievances is not 
lightly undertaken.  As events in 2014 were to show, these form the 
basis of the rejection of the GP framework after 2013 (by a broader 
coalition of civil society actors) and served as a substantive 
foundation of the business and human rights treaty movement that 
produced the adoption of a treaty exploration project by the Human 
Rights Council in June 2014,223 as well as the countermovement that 
sought to preserve the GP structure as the foundational framework for 
business and human rights in the international field.224 Also striking 
are the parallels between these objections, and the grounding premises 
of the previously rejected Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights.225  
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) championed the Draft 
Norms for a few key reasons: the promise of legally binding 
obligations on business, through an international treaty and 
subsequently national laws; the sweeping obligations on companies 
expected not only to ’respect’ human rights, but to ’promote’, 
’protect’, ’secure’ and ’ensure respect’ of human rights; and the 
monitoring and verification to be provided by international 
organizations, such as the UN, and national mechanisms. . . . To put it 
differently, no matter the possible shortcomings of the Norms initial 
draft in concept or formulation, they would pale in comparison with 
the importance of kick-starting the process.226 
The business community and many OECD states had fiercely 
opposed these Norms and contributed to their abandonment in 
2003.227 
 Initially, between 2011 and early 2013, these civil society 
actors were content to work through the Working Group system set 

223. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1, supra note 19. 
224. A/HRC/26/L.1, supra note 21.   
225. ECOSOC, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003).  
For a critical analysis, see Backer, supra note 144. 
226. See Radu Mares, Business and Human Rights After Ruggie: Foundations, the Art of 
Simplification and the Imperative of Cumulative Progress, in THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS—FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION (Radu Mares, ed. 
2012).   
227. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce and International Organization of 
Employers, Joint views of the IOE and ICC on the draft Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 
(March 2004), available at http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Links/Repository/179848/link_page_view. 
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up to manage development of the GP system.228 However, in the years 
after 2011, a number of prominent civil society actors began to join 
together to work to move beyond the GPs, which were increasingly 
viewed as a failure to protect against the human rights abuses of 
transnational enterprises, at least as these civil society actors saw it.229  
By 2013 these groups coalesced into a movement to seek multilateral 
action to take steps to revive the process of developing a treaty to 
regulate multinational corporations.230  The core civil society groups 
around which the so-called Treaty Alliance formed included CETIM, 
Dismantle Corporate Power Campaign, ESCR-Net, FIAN, FIDH, 
Franciscans International, Friends of the Earth International, and 
Transnational Institute.231 By 2014 the Treaty Alliance had grown to 
over 600 organizations.232 
 The Treaty Alliance and its supporters sought to use the GPs 
as a springboard to resurrect the processes of drafting a binding 
international treaty regulating transnational business enterprises, a 
process that had produced first a rejected Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations (in a process extending from 1972 
through 1992), and had thereafter produced the rejected norms on the 
responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with regard to human rights (1998-2004).233 The coalition 

228. Joint Civil Society Statement on the draft Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, supra note 19, at 3. (“We urge the Human Rights Council to create one or more 
Special Procedures or mechanisms to fulfill these functions, so as to ensure further 
development of robust, clear and workable guidance for the protection of human rights against 
business-related abuse.”). 
229. See Joint Statement: Call for an international legally binding instrument on human 
rights, transnational corporations and other business enterprises, GLOBAL MOVEMENT FOR A 
BINDING TREATY, www.treatymovement.com/statement (“It represents the collective 
expression of a growing mobilization of global civil society calling for further enhancement of 
international legal standards to address corporate infringements of human rights. It welcomes 
the recent initiatives by States in the United Nations Human Rights Council to develop an 
international treaty on legally binding rules for TNCs on human rights issues.”); see id. for list 
of signatory organizations.  
230.  “Many groups, including many members of the ESCR-Net Corporate 
Accountability Working Group since it began 10 years ago, have been supporting the adoption 
of binding international instruments to address corporate human rights abuse.  In Bangkok, at 
the ESCR-Net Peoples Forum on Human Rights & Business, participants formulated a Joint 
Statement that was signed by over 140 groups in less than one month.“ GLOBAL MOVEMENT 
FOR A BINDING TREATY, http://treatymovement.com/.  
231. Id.  
232. Joint Statement: Call for an international legally binding instrument on human 
rights, transnational corporations and other business enterprises, supra note 171.  
233. History: Timeline of Key Developments in the Struggle to Establish an International 
System of Accountability for Transnational Corporate Human Rights Abuses, GLOBAL 
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of civil society actors working toward that end made no secret of their 
effort to recast the history of thwarted efforts to develop a binding 
international treaty on the regulation of multinational corporations as 
an inevitable progress fighting against rear guard actions by certain 
states. They recast the process leading to the endorsement of the GPs 
in a more problematic light, arguing that at “the end of the second 
term of the SRSG, in June 2011, he presented Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights to the Human Rights Council, which 
were said to operationalise the Framework presented in 2008.  States 
on the Council did not oppose the Guiding Principles, even though 
they received strong criticism from civil society organisations in the 
lead up to the June session.”234 It was that effort, producing a 
“regressive approach towards the human rights obligations of States 
and the responsibilities of non-state actors“ required action to put the 
project of a legal framework for the regulation of multinational 
enterprises back on track.235  
The efforts were ultimately reflected in a Joint Statement 
seeking an internationally binding instrument on business and human 
rights to which civil society actors were encouraged to join (the “Joint 
Statement”).236 The Joint Statement was straightforward drawing 
from the earlier civil society critique of the draft GPs.237 The call for 
an internationally binding instrument on human rights noted the 
continuing abuses and violations of human rights by enterprises, the 
disproportionate effect of these abuses on women and other marginal 
groups, the precarious position of human rights defenders, and the 
initiatives taken by states and human rights experts.238 It underscored 
its adherence to the political premise that existing States have 
“obligations under global and regional human rights treaties and the 
need to implement and complement those treaties to make them 

MOVEMENT FOR A BINDING TREATY, (2014), http://treatymovement.com/ (“Since the early 
1970s there have been concerted efforts to develop binding international systems to regulate 
corporations for their human rights violations.”).  
234. Id. 
235. Id.  
236. Joint Statement: Call for an international legally binding instrument on human 
rights, transnational corporations and other business enterprises, List of Signatories, supra note 
171. 
237. See Joint Civil Society Statement on the draft Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, supra note 19. 
238. Joint Statement: Call for an international legally binding instrument on human 
rights, transnational corporations and other business enterprises, List of Signatories, supra note 
171. 
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effective in the context of business transnational operations.”239 All of 
this serves to convince the drafters of the “need to enhance the 
international legal framework, including international remedies, 
applicable to State action to protect rights in the context of business 
operations, and mindful of the urgent need to ensure access to justice 
and remedy and reparations for victims of corporate human rights 
abuse.“240  That enhancement has three parts.  First, states are called 
on to elaborate an international treaty that affirms the applicability of 
human rights obligations to transnational business, requires state 
monitoring of that obligation, including the imposition of a mandatory 
obligation to apply domestic law extraterritorially within the 
jurisdiction of other states, requires the expansion of judicial remedies 
to eliminate jurisdictional limits to hear cases coming under the 
treaty, and creates an international monitoring and accountability 
mechanism of unspecified character.241 Second, it calls on the UN 
Human Rights Council to take up this treaty elaboration project.242  
Third, it calls on civil society to ensure the movement toward a treaty 
described.243  The nostalgia and reactionary character of this 
statement is hard to avoid.  It derives its strength by looking back 
toward a world vision that pre-dates (and indeed rejects) 
globalization, and effectively seeks to leverage international public 
organizations to create a loosely structured global administrative 
state, operationalized through states but overseen through the 
normative direction, monitoring and discipline of the community of 
states organized through the UN system.  
 This civil society effort had a number of useful academic and 
other allies. These allies provided support, directly or indirectly, for 
projects that were aimed to move beyond or through the GPs to 
alternative or frameworks or alternative evolutionary paths (even if 
some of them appeared to look back rather than foreword).244  
Notable among them were David Weissbrodt, an instrumental figure 
in the creation of the Norms.245  His writings246 continued to defend 

239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
244. See generally Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect? (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013).  
245. See David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 
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the efforts to develop a treaty based framework that would impose 
direct international obligations on multinational enterprises—even if 
these would be realized only through transposition of international 
obligations within the domestic legal orders of states.247 Surya Deva 
nicely articulated the academic discontent with the GPs: 
The SRSG [John Ruggie] may pat his back for the ‘so-called’ 
consensus that he built around the ’protect, respect and remedy’ 
framework and for the unanimous approval of the Guiding 
Principles by the Human Rights Council. However, the fact of 
the matter is that instead of setting global human rights standards 
for companies, the Guiding Principles leave it to companies to 
ascertain their human rights responsibilities on a case-by-case 
basis. This circular . . . approach is unsatisfactory.248 
Professor Deva would instead welcome the formulation of 
corporate responsibility through a treaty creating binding law 
applicable to corporations from law bearing entities.249 These views, 
though by no means universally shared,250 are nonetheless quite 

AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 904-907 (2003) “In 1999 the working group set its agenda for the next 
two years. The 1999 meeting ended by asking David Weissbrodt to prepare a draft code of 
conduct for transnational corporations.” Id. at 904; Professor Weissbrodt also contributed to 
the preparation of the Norms Commentary. Id. at 905.  
246. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 
supra note 235  (“the Norms are the first non-voluntary initiative [in the area of business and 
human rights] accepted at the international level.“ Id. at 903, criticized in John G. Ruggie, 
Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819 
(2008) and Backer, supra note 144; David Weissbrodt, Keynote Address: International 
Standard-Setting on the Human Rights Responsibilities of Businesses, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
L. 373 (2008); see also David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Human Rights Responsibilities of 
Businesses as Non-State Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 553 (Philip 
Alston ed., 2005). David Weisbrodt, United Nations Charter-based Procedures for Addressing 
Human Rights Violations: Historical Practice, Reform, and Future Implications, in THE 
DELIVERY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR SIR NIGEL RODLEY 13 
(Geoff Gilbert, Françoise Hampson & Clara Sandoval eds., 2011). 
247. For a sympathetic defense and analysis see David Kinley and Rachel Chambers, 
The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 447 (2006). 
248. SURYA DEVA, REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: 
HUMANIZING BUSINESS 239 (2012). 
249. Id. at 238-39; see generally id; see also Robert C. Blitt, Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Charting an Embracive Approach to Corporate 
Human Rights Compliance, 48 TEX. INT’L L. J. 33 (2012). 
250. See, e.g., Ruggie, supra note 186; Backer, supra note 186. John Ruggie noted the 
pragmatism underlying much of his critique:  
I noted in my earlier brief that enumerating these challenges is not an argument 
against treaties. But it is a cautionary note to avoid going down a road that 
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powerful and influential, are predicated in part on an open rejection of 
one of the key foundations of the GPs—its acceptance of a 
polycentric governance order effectively instituted within the logic of 
globalization that has empowered, as against the conventional law-
state system, a (perhaps anarchic) system of societally self-constituted 
non-state governance organs, including enterprises, which interact 
with but the sources of norms for the organization and operation of 
which, are sourced outside of law and outside of the structures of 
states.251 While academic writings might have been useful, it may be 
more plausible to suggest that this challenge to the primacy of the GP 
as the framework for business and human rights activities, was 
principally driven by civil society.  There is irony here, of course, for 
that power of civil society evidences quite strongly the existence of 
the societally constituted and extra legal sphere,252 the coordination 
with which had been at the center of the GP project.   
 None of this would have amounted to much except for the 
efforts of several states that also remained loyal to the 1970s project 
of the state-based economic development project of the New 
International Economic Order,253 and its vision of a march toward 

would end in largely symbolic gestures, of little practical use to real people in 
real places, and with high potential for generating serious backlash against any 
form of further international legalization in this domain. 
John G. Ruggie, A UN Business and Human Rights Treaty Update, Harvard Kennedy 
School 2 (May 1, 2014), 
http://businesshumanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/ruggie-un-business-human-
rights-treaty-update-1-may-2014.pdf.  
251. See generally Larry C. Backer, In Defense of the State and the International Legal 
Order: Reflections on Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz, eds. 2013), LAW AT THE END OF 
THE DAY (Dec. 1, 2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/at-2nd-un-forum-on-
business-and-human.html. 
[R]eflect the deep and unrelenting suspicion of non-law based governance 
systems. The concept of social norms and or societal constituted communities 
is viewed both as illegitimate and as ineffective against the ideal of law. . . . 
This puts the critics of the GP on a conceptual collision course with the 
underlying framework of the GP themselves.  
Id. 
252. See generally GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION (2012); Jaye Ellis, Constitutionalization of 
Nongovernmental Certification Programs, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. (2013). 
253. Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order: United 
Nations General Assembly document A/RES/S-6/320 (May 1, 1974), available at  
http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3201.htm. The New International Economic Order rested on 
a set of critical premises which are central to the to the movement seeking to replace the 
Guiding Principles with a comprehensive treaty.  These include sovereign equality among 
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global order grounded in states but led by a norms-producing 
administration of global organizations representing the vanguard of 
progressive state elements, focused on the attainment of a particular 
vision of progress toward social, economic and cultural rights.254 Also 
useful was the move toward greater acceptance of the policy of top 
down internationalism—one pioneered in the course of the resolution 
of the financial crises that started in 2008.255 Led this time by the 
delegation from Ecuador,256 which undertook the hard diplomatic 
work of generating support among a sufficient number of HRC 
members, this group held together by their distrust of and distaste for 
the GP project was able to produce a change in the dynamics of 
international efforts at the operationalization of the GPs.   
At the core of their strategy was a reconceptualization of the 
GPs, rejecting the GP project as an objective, asserting that they were 

states, states as the driving force in the construction of a law based normative program, and the 
direct control by states of the national character of their domestic legal orders and their natural 
resources, the primacy of states as the center for the regulation and supervision of the activities 
of transnational corporations. See id. ¶ 4. Most prominently featured, though discretely, is 
Cuba, whose intellectual leadership in this area has been quite sustained since the 1970s, and 
whose former leader, Fidel Castro, was influential in the development of counter narratives to 
those of economic globalization. See generally Fidel Castro Ruz, Address By The President Of 
The Council Of State And Ministers Of The Republic Of Cuba, His Excellency Raul Castro 
Ruz, To The Mercosur Summit. Costa De Sauipe, Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, December 16, 2008 
available http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/rauldiscursos/2008/ing/c161208i.html  (“We are well 
aware of the efforts demanded by such objectives when down the road they must face such 
major obstacles as the effects of a selfish and unfair international economic order favoring the 
developed countries and the interests of the large multinational corporations of which the 
current financial and economic crisis is the most serious and palpable manifestation.“); and 
note 250 infra. 
254. See generally Larry Cata Backer, Odious Debt Wears Two Faces: Systemic 
Illegitimacy, Problems and Opportunities in Traditional Odious Debt Conceptions in 
Globalized Economic Regimes, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (2007). The best ideological 
expression of this view, one most faithful to the world vision of the last expression of 
European Stalinist Marxism, was provided by Cuba, the last faithful disciple of Stalinist 
European Leninism. Id. 
255. See generally Larry C. Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the 
State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board and the Global 
Governance Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751 (2011) (G20 can develop standards 
through complex public-private networks and then impose them through market and political 
power on states dependent on them for economic and other relations).  
256. See Texaco/Chevron lawsuits (re: Ecuador), Business & Human Rights Resource 
Centre, (18 Feb. 2014), http://business-humanrights.org/en/texacochevron-lawsuits-re-
ecuador#c9332. (Ecuador had its own agenda to further).; Ecuador: Inter-American Court 
ruling marks key victory for Indigenous Peoples, Amnesty International, (July 27, 2012), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/ 
ecuador-inter-american-court-ruling-marks-key-victory-indigenous-peoples-2012-07-26 
(and it had its own human rights issues). 
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merely a gateway to a more permanent and quite distinct objective.257 
“In August 2013, at the Regional Forum on Business and Human 
Rights for Latin America and the Caribbean, and later at UN Human 
Rights Council 24th session in September 2013, the representative of 
Ecuador before the UN made a declaration proposing that the UN 
begin work on a legally binding international instrument on business 
and human rights.258 That declaration259 also paralleled the joint civil 
society statement discussed earlier and was countered by John Ruggie 
himself.260  It welcomed the efforts around the GPs, but suggested that 
the increase in human rights related abuses by some multinational 
enterprises suggested the need to move beyond the GPs, and that this 
“beyond“ was a “legally binding framework to regulate the work of 
transnational corporations and to provide appropriate protection, 
justice and remedy to the victims of human rights abuses directly 
resulting from or related to the activities of some transnational 
corporations and other businesses enterprises“.261 To that end, the 
GOPs and their endorsement could only be understood as a “first 
step“ which necessarily must lead to a treaty. Necessarily because the 
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257. G.A. Res, 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 2011). 
For this purpose they could draw on the mandate for the establishment of the Working 
Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council, human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises.  
The Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council: 
[r]ecognizes the role of the Guiding Principles for the implementation of the 
Framework, on which further progress can be made, as well as guidance that 
will contribute to enhancing standards and practices with regard to business 
and human rights, and thereby contribute to a socially sustainable 
globalization, without foreclosing any other long-term development, including 
further enhancement of standards.  
Id. at 2. 
258. See Binding Treaty, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, http://business-
humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty-pros-and-cons (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).  
259. See Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (September 2013), 
http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/statement-unhrc-legally-
binding.pdf (statement on behalf of the African Group, the Arab Group, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Kyrgyzstan, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador).  
260. See John G. Ruggie, A UN Business and Human Rights Treaty? An Issues Brief, 
Harvard Kennedy School (Jan. 28 2014), http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Links/Repository/1024755. On January 28, 2014, the former UN Special 
Representative on business & human rights, Professor John Ruggie released an issues brief in 
response to Ecuador’s proposal for a legally binding instrument, and updates on the issue on 
May and on June 2014. Id. 
261. See id. 
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GPs remain nothing more than “soft law,”262 something that in the 
world view of the proposing states implied an inferior and 
unsatisfying means of regulation. Again rejecting polycentricity and 
embracing the premise that only law derived from state power had 
any legitimacy, the statement noted that the GP framework was 
hobbled by its lack of state power. What was required was a law-
based system that clarified the obligations of transnational 
corporations, and of these enterprises in relation to states (that is 
affirmed the hierarchy of authority conventionally understood and 
thus produce a direct attack on polycentricity), and broadens 
substantially the jurisdiction of national courts over global 
enterprises.263  
The push for a treaty to supersede the GPs produced the same 
divisions that had marked discussion a generation ago on the 
development of an international code for transnational enterprises and 
later shadowed the work on the Norms.  These divisions echoed the 
old Cold War ideological rhetoric, but now clothed in the discursive 
tropes of globalization, human rights, development and “neo-
liberalism,”264 continues to pit the old “third world” and the ancient 
“socialist camp” against the old established capitalist democracies and 
former imperial powers.265 Treaty advocates continue to see the world 
in old two dimensional ideological terms: states are pre-eminent but 
are bound to progress, led by a vanguard that through international 
engagement can set the substantive premises within which states will 
progress toward economic, social and cultural advancement 
appropriate to their circumstances, but which will free them from 
subservience to the old imperial powers.  These powers now exercise 
authority indirectly, through the management of markets in which 
their economic enterprises dominate.  Those enterprises may appear 
autonomous of their home states, but they are still seen as instruments 
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262. Cf. Jaye Ellis, Shades of Grey: Soft Law and the Validity of Public International 
Law, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. (2012). 
263. See generally Ruggie, supra note 260. 
264. Cf. Larry C. Backer, Ideologies of Globalization and Sovereign Debt: Cuba and the 
IMF, 24 PENN ST. INT’L. L. REV. (2006). 
265. Cf. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 7-24 
(2013).  
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of home state policies and therefore as attached to and subject to the 
control of home states.266  
Treaty opponents continue to resist the idea of a comprehensive 
treaty for reasons of ideology and pragmatism. A generation of 
struggle in this respect has indicated that there is insufficient 
consensus for a treaty. Globalization has made treaty powers less 
important and elevated non-state governance systems in prominence. 
They also recognize the autonomy of institutional power beyond 
states, though some, especially the United States, continue to struggle 
in this respect.  Much of the opposition efforts to supersede the GPs 
by a comprehensive treaty are pragmatic: treaty making vaunts 
formalism over functional results in ways that will likely produce an 
empty symbol rather than operationalizable systems with real effects 
on the ground, any effort to develop enforcement would require 
radical restructuring of the state system, the preservation of the 
prerogatives of which ironically fuel the move toward treaty 
alternatives, and that efforts to centralize enforcement in international 
public bodies are both impractical and inconsistent with the formal 
structures of power the treaty route is meant to embody.267 But some 
of the opposition is defensive—treaties are viewed as efforts to permit 
the mass of poor but numerous states to usurp power (through the 
democratic politics of multilateralism in international institutions) 
against the smaller number of rich and powerful states to set an 
agenda that might be incompatible with the ideological value 
hierarchies of these states (which tend to value civil and political 
rights over social, economic and cultural rights, especially the United 
States),268 and to seek to treat economic enterprises as 
instrumentalities of home states breaches a core ideological premise 
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266. Cf. Larry C. Backer, Odious Debt Wears Two Faces: Systemic Illegitimacy, 
Problems and Opportunities in Traditional Odious Debt Conceptions in Globalized Economic 
Regimes, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1(2007). 
267. Cf. Ruggie, supra note 204. 
268. See U.N., National Plans of Action for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, Norway, Plan of Action for Human Rights (2000-2005), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/PlansActions/Pages/PlansofActionIndex.aspx. But not just 
the United States. “The primary objective of the Norwegian Government’s human rights 
efforts is to ensure respect for and protection of human dignity. The traditional Western 
approach to human rights has been to focus on civil and political rights rather than economic, 
social and cultural rights. We need to recognize the fact that human rights constitute an 
indivisible, interdependent whole. Only when all rights are respected are human rights being 
fully protected.” Id. at 2. 
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of the framework of globalization that these states continue to 
advance.  
Neither camp has thus far been able to defeat the other. Each 
continues to protect its interest within the governance architecture of 
the United Nations. The GPs and the treaty framework raised to 
supplant it are in a larger sense just another battleground in an old and 
unfinished battle for control of the discourse of constitutionalization 
and the role of states and non-state actors within it.269 These divisions 
are made clear by comparing the resolutions approved by the HRC of 
Ecuador, “Elaboration of an International Treaty” (Ecuador 
Resolution),270 and of Norway, continuing the GP work of the UN 
Working Group (Norway Resolution).271 The parallels between the 
Ecuador Resolution and the several joint statements produced by civil 
society since January 2011 are unmistakable. They indicate not 
merely ideological solidarity and political alliance, but also quite 
clearly an effort to reject the normative premises that led to the 
construction of the GPs and the elaboration of a pragmatic and 
realistic approach to the regulation of the human rights detrimental 
conduct of enterprises consistent with the realities of governance as it 
is evolving in fact.  The Ecuador Resolution presents an ideologically 
coherent, though anachronistic, expression of a world view that was at 
its peak in the 1970s when, for an instant, global consensus appeared 
to be moving toward an apotheosis of a global Westphalian order 
grounded in principles of command economies and the 
marginalization of private markets (the New International Economic 
Order),272 now abandoned in favor of globalization and its open 
borders and polycentric governance. The ideological foundations—
state supremacy, state based internationalism in the development of 
substantive principles for domestic law, and the primacy of 
international frameworks for the dismantling of colonial systems of 
state to state relations—are invoked first.273 These are meant to frame 
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269. See generally Larry Catá Backer, The Concept of Constitutionalization and the 
Multi-Corporate Enterprise in the 21st Century 1-27 (Coalition for Peace & Ethics, Working 
Paper 6/1, 2014, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2458965.  
270. See G.A. Res, 26/3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (June 25, 2014) (the 
resolution was sponsored by Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, South Africa, and Venezuela). 
271. See G.A. Res, 26/3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.1 (June 23, 2014).  
272. See, e.g., G.A. Res, S-6/7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 (May 1, 1974).  
273. See G.A. Res, 26/3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (June 25, 2014).  Most telling 
is the invocation of the right to development, a product of a mindset at the cusp of 
globalization in the mid 1980s and the last flower of the ideological campaigns of the socialist 
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the approach to the treaty elaboration that is the subject of this 
resolution.   
The object then is to manage, if not eliminate the private sector, 
or at least to subordinate it to the command of the state and its 
direction, an ideology central to the economic policy of Ecuador, 
Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia, all core members of the ALBA trade 
group.274 That objective is to be realized, under ALBA ideology, 
through coordinated state control of economic operations.275 This 
more than anything should serve as a caution to those who would 
abandon the GPs for a treaty. Its movants have a definitive policy 
agenda that may be realized through business and human rights 
internationalization, but human rights might well be a means to the re-
ordering of the global economic sector along lines that are 
substantially different from those that underlie economic 
globalization.276 
But even as the premises of state supremacy and development 
are privileged, the GPs are cabined and minimized within these 
broader currents in two important respects. The GPs are 
contextualized as one expression of a long progress of efforts by the 
international community to regulate business enterprises—that is, as a 
part of “all previous Human Rights Council resolutions on the issues 
of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises.”277 This makes plain the political objective of the 
developing states who formed the core of the state group advancing 
the Ecuadorian Resolution:278 the object of treaty making is not to 
develop a comprehensive regulation of economic activity with human 
rights implications, rather it is to develop methods for the control of 
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camp in the United Nations. See G.A. Res, 41/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (December 4, 
1986). 
274. See generally Larry Catá Backer & Augusto Molina, Cuba And The Construction 
Of Alternative Global Trade Systems: ALBA And Free Trade In The Americas, 31 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 679 (2010). 
275. See G.A. Res, 26/3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.1 (June 23, 2014). It is in this context 
that the expression of state supremacy in the Ecuadorian resolution acquires deeper meaning: 
“the obligations and primary responsibility to promote and protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms lie with the State, and that States must protect against human rights 
abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including transnational 
corporations.” Id. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. at 1. 
278. Ecuador Resolution, supra note 34. These include the Plurinational States of 
Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, South Africa, and Venezuela.  
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transnational corporations that are still viewed as instrumentalities of 
their home states and of these home states’ sovereign investing goals. 
In that context they are also understood as essential to development 
through their “capacity to foster economic well-being, development, 
technological improvement and wealth, as well as causing adverse 
impacts on human rights.“279   
 As such, the Ecuadorian Resolution seeks to refine the 
principles of non-interference in the right to development by 
constraining the foundational basis of globalization (free movement 
of capital, goods and investment) exercised through private markets, 
markets which are understood as subterfuges masking the projection 
of developed state power (through multinational enterprises) into 
developing states to exploit its resources and labor for the benefit of 
home states.280  These constraints are perfectly understandable given 
the political premises buried deeply within the quite politically 
charged words of the Ecuadorian Resolution. But it has caused 
confusion and led to criticism by other actors less aware of the deep 
political agenda that these choices represent. And indeed, for its 
opponents, this choice, made inevitable by the political framework 
within which the Ecuadorian Resolution was offered, clearly 
evidences its incompatibility with the foundational premises 
underlying the GPs.281 It is a constraint that may well come back to 
haunt the resolution’s drafter’s—but one that is central to the ideology 
that Resolution embodies.  
 This foundation then produces the framework of the 
resolution and the context within which its work would be 
undertaken:  
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279. Id. at 2. 
280. The theory is elegant and derived from an application of Cuban political theory, 
which has been largely suspicious of globalization and of developed states and the global 
financial system that they have created. See, e.g., FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, ON IMPERIALIST 
GLOBALIZATION (2003) (arguing that globalization frames an imperialist world order, 
organized around new forms of economic exploitation, attacks on national sovereignty, 
cultural subjugation, and military aggression); FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, CAPITALISM IN CRISIS 
(2000) (condemning the deleterious systemic impact of economic globalization on developing 
states and advanced capitalist countries); Backer, Odious Debt Wears Two Faces, supra note 
266. 
281. “A fundamental flaw lies in Ecuador’s insistence that the treaty focus on 
multinational companies, even though any company can cause problems and most standards, 
including the UN principles, don’t draw this artificial distinction.” ARVIND GANESAN, 
DISPATCHES: A TREATY TO END CORPORATE ABUSES, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 1, 
2014).   
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To establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group on 
a legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises with respect to human rights, the 
mandate of which shall be to elaborate an international legally 
binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, 
the activities of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises.282  
While many might focus on the part of that resolution that 
establishes an mechanism for treaty making, it is the sort of treaty 
making envisioned, and its character, that should be of greater 
interest. For the objective (mandate) is to establish an international 
legally binding instrument to regulate in international law the 
activities specified. But consider the constraints inherent in that 
mandate: the treaty will produce international law, law that is binding 
on those states acceding to it to the extent not otherwise reserved.  But 
it will have no internal domestic effect, except and to the extent that 
states domesticate these international obligations, under the principles 
of legality and state sovereignty that provides the framework for this 
resolution. Thus while it might serve to harden domestic law in some 
states, it does not guarantee transposition into domestic law.  Yet this 
is precisely the condition one finds oneself with the GPs—which 
point to a framework that might well be transposed to domestic law, 
at the instance of the state, but which otherwise remains “soft“ and 
binding only on the state (and not those resident or transient within 
it). Thus the greatest irony of the Resolution is that it is geared to do 
little but create potential law (in the sense that it is binding on 
individuals) and otherwise will produce nothing more than a 
framework for soft law from which custom may develop form the 
bottom up; functionally the equivalent position as the GPs. Here one 
vaunts symbolism and gesture over substance. 
 The Ecuadorian Resolution, then, presents irony. It rejects the 
central premises of the GPs, but offers nothing more substantive than 
the promise of an international instrument that will be used by its 
adherents and ignored by the rest of the states. It will then produce 
large margins of appreciation in standards for governing human rights 
related to business that will in turn contribute to a widening 
incoherence in those human rights standards that the GP project was 
itself meant to narrow. Efforts at international law making, 
perversely, will contribute to rather than reduce, policy and regulatory 
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282. Ecuador Resolution, supra note 34.  
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incoherence. That incoherence will be deepened by the likelihood of 
substantial differences in defining the scope of human rights subject 
to treaty treatment and those excluded. Beyond the issue of 
cataloguing, raised by John Ruggie in his critique of the Ecuadorian 
Resolution, lies the larger issue of ideology.  The last half-century has 
seen a large chasm between states that have privileged social, 
economic and cultural rights and those that have privileged civil and 
political rights.283 That chasm is unlikely to be bridged soon.  In the 
absence of treaty language that is so generalized as to be shaped to the 
desires of states that apply it, there is little likelihood that consensus 
will be possible. This is particularly the case with respect to the 
understanding of the nature and character of the transnational 
enterprise. Developing states and others will continue to see in the 
transnational corporation an instrumentality of their home states.  
That premise makes transnational corporations different in character 
from “domestic“ or local enterprises that operate within a domestic 
order. It suggests that asset partitioning and legal personality of multi-
corporate enterprises might be more easily ignored and obligations 
more easily moved up and down supply and value chains. It also 
suggests that the activities of transnational enterprises are public and 
political as much as economic and market based. In that context, 
significant state regulation, including control of economic decision 
making makes sense. Developed states will continue to defend the 
autonomy of the corporate enterprise and that of private markets.  
That has consequences as well for the way in which one approaches 
the regulation of the human rights impacts of transnational 
corporations. The asset partitioning and autonomy of separately 
incorporated corporations, and the sanctity of contractual relations (as 
private law) will be defended. The private nature of economic activity 
will serve as a guiding premise that militates against significant 
efforts at state control of economic activity, rather than imposition of 
consequences for damages caused by human rights detrimental 
activity. Most importantly, the premises of globalization and private 
markets also make incomprehensible any distinction between 
transnational and domestic corporations or other enterprises.  

283. Larry Catá Backer, Realizing Socio-Economic Rights Under Emerging Global 
Regulatory Frameworks: The Potential Impact of Privatization and the Role of Companies in 
China and India, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 615, 617 (2013) [hereinafter Realizing] 
(discussing the chasm between states).  
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The Ecuadorian Resolution also contains within it a core insight 
that is quite powerful, though limited in scope. As we have seen in the 
context of the difficulties of attaining coherence in the project of 
developing NAPs that elaborate the state duty to protect human rights, 
state action is inherently a subject of legal discourse and operates best 
within the strictures of rule of law systems. NAPs also present 
difficult issues of compliance.284  That is their nature—at least 
legitimately constituted states (whatever their governing political 
ideology).285 It follows that state practice convergence can be made 
easier through treaty making.  Confined to the ordering of the state 
duty to protect human rights, the treaty making imperative is sensible 
and useful.  It serves to discipline the anarchic “natural“ state of 
Westphalian state autonomy within the matrices of norm structures 
created and maintained by the community of states, norm structures 
that reflect a consensus among states respecting the sorts of behaviors 
expected of states as they engage in their duty to protect human 
rights.  But notice here what this entails—the object is not the 
regulation of transnational corporations through treaties, it is the 
regulation of states that ought to be the object of the treaty making 
specified in the Ecuadorian Resolution.  That is the great insight of 
Section II that may be applied to the GP project of state duty. The 
treaty making objectives of the Ecuadorean Resolution, then, can 
serves its highest purpose by seeking to develop a framework for 
disciplining states in the ordering of their domestic legal orders to 
more coherently regulate and discipline economic activity within their 
borders.  Thus, the problem is not the transnational corporation and its 
abuses, it is the state and its failures. It is to the overcoming of those 
failures that treaty making ought to be directed by states for states.  
 In contrast, The Norway Resolution offers an alternative 
vision that is both sensitive to the needs of legalization of the 
standards for managing enterprise conduct at the international level, 
and to the realities of the open, porous, permeable and polycentric 
governance networks286 that now operate within globalization. The 
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284. Realizing, supra note 225 at 624. 
285. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism:  An Introduction to a 
New Legal Global Ordering, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85-172 (2009); Larry Catá 
Backer, Party, People, Government, and State: On Constitutional Values and the Legitimacy 
of the Chinese State-Party Rule of Law System, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 331-408 (2012). 
286. See Larry Catá Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for the 21st 
Century: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and Polycentricity, 17 TILBURG L. REV. 177-199 
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preliminary statements of the Norway Resolution seek to make the 
case for a quite distinct vision of the project of business and human 
rights, one that embraces the foundations of economic globalization, 
that is more suspicious of states as the principal source of human 
rights regulation of business, and more willing to coordinate with 
non-state governance systems to reach a functionally coherent multi-
systemic approach to disciplining business behavior.  It is certainly 
messier and less formally coherent than the vision presented by the 
ALBA states in the Ecuadorian Resolution, but it is also more 
functionally coherent and closer to the realities on the ground. Yet it 
is also important to remember that the Norway Resolution was meant 
to “extend the mandate of the Working Group on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises as 
set out in Human Rights Council resolution 17/4 for a period of three 
years.“287 Within that objective, the Norway Resolution inverted the 
contextualization attempted in the Ecuador Resolution.  Where the 
Ecuador Resolution sought to contextualize and lessen the importance 
f the GPs within a larger framework fo work that appeared to lead to 
treaty making, the Norway Resolution sought to contextualize treaty 
making within the greater project of developing the GPs.  Paragraph 8 
of the Norway Resolution: 
Requests the Working Group to launch an inclusive and 
transparent consultative process with States in 2015, open to 
other relevant stakeholders, to explore and facilitate the sharing 
of legal and practical measures to improve access to remedy, 
judicial and non-judicial, for victims of business-related abuses, 
including the benefits and limitations of a legally binding 
instrument, and to prepare a report thereon and to submit it to the 
Human Rights Council at its thirty-second session.288  
Treaty-making thus is converted from a principal objective to a 
mechanism for moving the GP project forward.  It also requested that 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights investigate the possibilities 
of extending legal frameworks to regulate the complicity of 
enterprises in gross human rights abuses, picking up the suggestion 
for targeted treaty making first proposed by John Ruggie as an 
alternative to the comprehensive treaty approach of the Ecuador 
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(2012); see generally JEAN L. COHEN, GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY: RETHINKING 
LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM (2012). 
287. Norway Resolution, supra note 212 at 11. 
288. Id. supra note 212 at 8.  
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Resolution.289 As for the rest, the Norway Resolution continued to 
emphasize the major premises of the GP project:  embedding the GPs 
in governance institutions, greater efforts by states to conform their 
domestic legal orders to their duty to protect human rights, and 
greater emphasis on finding more effective remedial mechanisms.  
Many of these serve to answer some of the challenges raised by civil 
society and the Ecuador Resolution—the upsurge in human rights 
abuses by transnational corporations, the failures by states to 
operationalize the GPs, the difficulty of recourse to remedies. At the 
same time, the Norway Resolution went out of its way to emphasize a 
fundamental distinction between the GP and treaty processes. The GP 
process envisioned by the Norway Resolution includes a substantial 
space for participation by civil society and other non-state actors.  It 
provides a space for meaningful dialogue and socialization among 
major stakeholders in systems of human rights behavior discipline—
through law or non-law rule systems or the development of custom.  
In contrast, and by implication, a treaty-making process is necessarily 
opaque.  Treaties are the business of states, and the process may be as 
transparent as states deem it wise to make them.  The modern trend is 
to preserve secrecy.290 
 The Norway Resolution also opens the possibility to finding a 
way of converging adherence to the GP framework, structured around 
the activities of the Working Group, especially with respect to the 
state duty to protect human rights and its related Third Pillar 
elements, combined with the core insight of the Ecuador Resolution 
that a binding international legal instrument is necessary to produce 
coherence among states using the only discursive framework 
intelligible to states—law.  The Ecuadorean Resolution speaks to the 
creation of an open-ended intergovernmental working group on a 
legally binding instrument on transnational corporations.291  While a 
legally binding instrument, a treaty or convention in this case, sounds 
in the singular, it does not mean that the construction of that 
instrument must also be considered in the singular.  It is possible to 
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conceive of the project of the production of a binding instrument as 
made up of any number of subparts.  Each of these subparts may be 
negotiated separately and put forward provisionally or seriatim as part 
of the greater project of producing, in the aggregate, and as the final 
product of these efforts, the legal instrument referenced in the 
Ecuadorian Resolution. It is thus possible to implement the 
Ecuadorean Resolution in stages, stages that produce a series of 
specifically targeted treaties, each constructed as a component of what 
together will produce the integrated international legal instrument 
specified in the Resolution.  That approach produces tremendous 
benefits to both those states seeking a legal basis for the construction 
of domestic legal rule of law orders in states that are coherent and 
harmonized between them.  At the same time it would fit neatly into 
the GP regime by focusing treaty making on the ordering of state 
power and authority on states without foreclosing the continued 
development of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, 
or the coordinating role of international organizations as spaces where 
consensus on substantive premises may be developed.  
In this way it is possible to achieve coherence between the 
Norwegian and Ecuadorean Resolutions.  In this way it will be 
possible to use the treaty making facility in ways most suited to its 
character—the disciplining of states by defining their legal 
obligations (to other states) and specifying their duty in the 
construction of their domestic legal orders. At the same time, it will 
avoid pretensions to comprehensiveness by avoiding efforts to move 
beyond the realm of law to the governance spaces reserved to 
societally constituted entities—transnational enterprises, civil society 
and other non-state actors with internal governance systems—which 
is the realm of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights.  
Lastly, it provides a basis for common ground between them in the 
construction of the dispute resolution mechanisms of the Third 
Pillar—through treat discipline for states, and otherwise for non-state 
actors.  The remedial pillar requires some refocusing—from states 
and enterprises to the victims of human rights abuses.  This has not 
been easy as states and enterprises focus on their needs and 
objectives.  Here is one area where an international body may be 
appropriately constituted to provide interpretive guidance on the 
application of the GPs in the context of individual complaints, a 
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suggestion I have made elsewhere.292   It is in the remedial pillar that 
the difficulties identified in Section II (with respect to states) and 
Section III (worth respect to enterprises), suggests resolution beyond 
either and in the international organizations from which the normative 
content of the human rights obligations of both are best expressed.  
CONCLUSION 
 In introducing the Protect/Respect/Remedy framework, John 
Ruggie argued presciently that the “business and human rights debate 
currently lacks an authoritative focal point. Claims and counter-
claims proliferate, initiatives abound, and yet no effort reaches 
significant scale. Amid this confusing mix, laggards—States as well 
as companies—continue to fly below the radar.”293 He emphasized 
that there was no “silver bullet solution to the institutional 
misalignments in the business and human rights domain.”294 He 
warned of the danger of conflating state duties, corporate 
responsibilities and the leadership role of the international community 
in order to craft a system, conventionally reassuring but fairly well 
guaranteed to fail precisely because it was not responsive to the 
changed conditions brought on by globalization.295 
The paths taken by international and national stakeholders in the 
construction of governance systems across these governance 
frameworks since 2011 suggest both the power of the logic of the GP 
framework, and its frailty. National Action Plans can serve as a 
unifying framework for developing the state duty to protect human 
rights.  But it can also devolve into a means of avoiding that duty by a 
misguided focus on corporate regulation detached from the 
connections to unifying principles of human rights at the heart of the 
GP’s First Pillar. Reporting and assurance programs, on the one hand, 
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and disclosure and access systems through exchange regulations on 
the other hand, offer a promise of operationalizing the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights. But these can also degenerate 
into context specific and fact rich exercises that hide more than they 
reveal and that are grounded in protection from liability rather than 
discovery and remediation of human rights wrongs in the course of 
enterprise activity. Lastly, international standards can serve as the 
glue that binds both state duty and corporate responsibility by 
providing the basis for law (through state) and behavior rules (for 
enterprises) that reinforce each other within the GP framework. 
International fora serve as the nexus point for top-down and bottom-
up law-rule making that is organically developed, internalized within 
societally constituted groups and embedded into domestic legal orders 
of states. But these efforts can devolve into a fruitless search for a 
theoretically pure and comprehensive legal and international 
framework for the regulation of business enterprises mashed into the 
formally constraining and limited mechanisms of formal treaty 
making. 
 In a speech marking the 60th anniversary of the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence296 held in Beijing June 28, 2014, 
President Xi Jingping “urged the international community to jointly 
promote the rule of law in international relations. ‘We should urge all 
parties to abide by international law and well-recognized basic 
principles governing international relations and use widely applicable 
rules to tell right from wrong and pursue peace and development,’ 
said the Chinese president.”297  This insight, by one of the states that 
voted in favor of the Ecuadorian Resolution, provides the 
foundational insight on which further work on implementing that 
resolution might well be undertaken.298 The Ecuador Resolution, then, 
might be most usefully understood and applied in this light—to use 
the treaty machinery to construct a well-integrated, long term, and 
ultimately comprehensive rule of law system for business and human 
rights. 
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 Business and human rights treaties can help construct an 
international rule of law system binding on all states in equal 
measure, and which can serve as a means of connection with the 
development of transnational business behavior norms that fall within 
the social (non-state) sphere. That work would require, to begin with, 
the necessary but hard work of mapping the extent of the current 
landscape of the state duty to protect—a project at the heart of the 
Working Group’s NAP project299 and the operationalization of the 
GPs.  It then requires a structuring of relations among states and non-
state actors within their distinct realms of activities, sensitive to the 
realities of globalization at the heart of the GP’s corporate 
responsibility project and an important element of the Second 
Pillar.300 Within this foundational structure the community of states 
might then turn to the slow, careful, and logical crafting of a well 
conceived program of law making, through treaty, that would, when 
completed, produce the comprehensive treaty based approach to the 
state’s duty to protect human rights envisioned in the Ecuadorian 
Resolution.  The product would be a system of interlocking treaties 
establishing the rule of law in international relations that together 
would serve as the legal baseline for state compliance with their duty 
to protect human rights in a coherent manner that would, in turn, be 
coordinated with the governance regimes of non-state actors now so 
critical to the functioning of the global economic order. 
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